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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF EXPERffiNCE IN INFANTS' REPRESENTATIONS
OF UNSEEN, SOUNDING OBJECTS

SEPTEMBER

1999

MONICA R. SYLVIA, B.A., FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY
M.S.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rachel K. Clifton

The purpose of the
infants' reaching

current study

was

toward sounding objects

to investigate the role of representations in

in the dark.

Infants

were divided

into

two

groups, a silent-object and a sound-experience group, and were allowed to reach
for and

manipulate a toy

in the light.

For infants

completely silent whereas for infants

in the silent-object group, the toy

in the

remained

sound-experience group, the same toy began

to

produce a doorbell sound once they had reached for and were manipulating

in

both groups then were presented with

this

sound

in the

Infants

it.

dark and their reaching

behavior was observed.

The frequency

rate of infants' reaches in the dark

experience with the sounding toy in the

light.

Infants

associate the doorbell sound with the toy in the light

group) reached during more of the dark
opportunity

(i.e.

trials

was

affected by their

who were

(i.e.

than infants

given the opportunity to

infants in the sound-experience

who were

not given this

infants in the silent-object group). This result supports the

representation hypothesis, which suggests that infants reach toward sounds presented to

them

in the

dark based on their representations of the objects associated with those

vi

sounds.

More

from the

results of previous reaching in the dark
studies, namely, that infants as

6

Vi

importantly, this result lends support to the
primary conclusion drawn

months can form and

when

utilize representations to

those objects are no longer visible.

vii

young

guide their behavior toward objects
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
What Are

we

Everyday,

rely

the world. For example,

Representations?

on representations

when

to help us reason

giving directions to the nearest gas station,

"imagine" traveling along the route as

we

describe

In another case,

it.

through a darkened room during a mid-night power outage,
of the room, the location of furniture relative to where
size

and shape of

about objects and events

we

that furniture, etc. In both instances,

our representations of objects and events

to solve the

we might

we might

when

do not

clearly define them.

navigating

"picture" the layout

are standing, the approximate

one might argue

problems

at

that

we

relied

on

hand. Yet while

scenarios such as these help us to think about the various contexts in which
representations, they

in

we might

The question remains, "What

use

exactly

are representations?".

Numerous

attempts have been

their role in cognition.

For instance,

made

at

Stillings (1995) referred to

representational systems as formal systems for

information. Based on

relating

them

this,

defining representations and identifying

making

explicit certain entities or types of

he defined representations as

to actual objects

and events

in the world.

Marr's definition of

sets

of symbols and rules for

In this light, representations

include abstract symbols, words, statements, and/or images, as well as our ability to

may
make

these entities correspond to reality. According to this definition, symbols, words, and/or

images

may have comprised

scenarios.

More

the representations

on which we

relied in the

above

importantly, however, these representations must have involved a

1

correspondence between these symbols, words, and/or
images and the actual route
nearest gas station and placement of the furniture

While

to the

itself.

the definition offered by Stillings
(1995) emphasizes the correspondence

between representations and

reality, alternative definitions

revolve around the role that

representations play in cognition. According to Rumelhart
and

Norman

(1988),

representations are those mental activities that allow us to reach
conclusions about
objects and events in the world in the absence of those objects
and events themselves.
Similarly,

come

Mandler (1998) defined representations

to influence our behavior.

According

as stored pieces of information

which

to these definitions, the representations

utilized in the previous scenario of giving directions to the nearest gas station
once again

may have consisted
route that

we

of symbols, words, and/or images that allowed us to reason about the

described. For instance, these representations

may have

enabled us to

provide landmarks, to estimate the distances between them, and to reason about the order
in

which they occur without

actually having to travel the route ourselves. Likewise,

would have been those symbols, words, and/or images

representations

that

allowed us to

reason about the probable location of the furniture in the darkened room and adjust our

behavior accordingly without actually being able to see the furniture

A final

definition of representations formulated by Piaget and described by

Mandler (1988) emphasizes

the key

component of representations alluded

Rumelhart and Norman (1988) and Mandler (1998), namely,
absence of

direct, perceptual information.

of absent objects and events"

122).

itself.

Based on

by both

that they exist in the

As Mandler (1988) pointed

lies at the heart

to

out, the "evocation

of Piaget' s definition of representations

(p.

his definition, she suggested that representations revolve around one's

2

ability to "re-present to the

conscious mind" a previously experienced object
or event

in

the absence of on-going perceptual support
(Mandler, 1988, p. 122). Like the one

proposed by

symbols

Stillings (1995), this definition necessitates
the existence of

to refer to absent objects

and symbols can be related

and events,

as well as a

images or

system by which these images

to reality.

Overall, each of the definitions offered here share two
important distinctions,

namely, those between the "represented" versus the 'representing
world" and
"descriptions" versus representations.

represented world

is

other hand, refers to

the physical environment around us.

how we

entities in our thinking

The representing world, on

and reasoning which correspond

is

a symbol for a given entity that gets

its

plays in the system of representation. In contrast, a representation

behind that symbol. For example,
the actual furniture itself

given piece of furniture

would be

(i.e. its

As

to these selected

one between descriptions and representations. As

suggested, a description

the

select various aspects of the represented world to

aspects constitute representations and are part of the representing world.
this distinction is

out, the

portray that environment in our thinking and reasoning.

Rumelhart and Norman suggested, we

map; the

As Rumelhart and Norman (1988) pointed

in the

Embedded

in

Stillings (1995)

value from the role

is

it

the information

darkened room scenario previously described,

part of the represented world,

where

image of a

as our

shape, location, size, etc.) would be part of our

representing world. Furthermore, this image would be considered a symbol that

describes our representation of the actual piece of furniture

Taken

itself.

together, the various definitions of representations discussed here provide a

basis for answering our initial question,

"What

3

exactly are representations?".

It is

clear

from the definitions just presented
in

that there are essentially

two

criteria that

order for something to be considered a representation.
First of

must involve stored information regarding an
or experienced previously that

is

evoked

all,

must be met

a representation

object or event which has been perceived

in the

absence of that object or event

itself.

Secondly, that information must provide a means by which
one can reason or draw
conclusions about that object or event and/or guide his/her future
actions and behavior.

Tvpes of Representational Svstems

As

the definitions provided

and Mandler ( 1988, 1998)

all

by

Stillings (1995),

Rumelhart and Norman (1988),

suggest, representations can exist in a variety of formats.

For example, propositional representations involve
certain entities in the represented world (Rumelhart

sets of

symbols or propositions about

& Norman).

Likewise, the symbolic

system of representation described by Mandler (1998) uses formal propositions or
statements to represent objects and events.

system usually are couched
this light, propositional

As she described

in language, with

it,

representations in this

words representing

and symbolic representations are most

objects, events, etc. In

in line

with the definition

offered by Stillings because they involve formal systems of symbols or propositions that

necessitate rules for relating

As Mandler (1998)
is

them

to reality.

pointed out, several problems exist with the

way

information

depicted in propositional and symbolic representational systems. For example, she

maintained that these systems cannot describe sensorimotor information adequately

because

it is

difficult to specify

Mandler asserted

that these

such information with words or symbols. In addition,

systems cannot account for learning from birth since the

4

systems of language and symbols used to
represent objects and events

must be

first

learned before information can be represented.
In light of the

Rumelhart

problems just mentioned, Mandler
(1998), along with others

& Norman,

1988; Stillmgs, 1995;

etc.)

(e.g.

pointed to the existence of a second

representational system, namely, a procedural system
of representation. In this system,

knowledge

is

represented in terms of active processes or procedures.
Representations

thus are tied to the performance of a certain task and are
not available apart from one's
ability to

perform

that task

(Rumelhart

& Norman,1988;

sensorimotor information being represented
(1998) pointed out that the storage of

performance of the task

at

hand.

As

this

in this

Mandler, 1998). While the

system

may be

information can be demonstrated through one's

a result, this system meets her definition of

representations as stored pieces of information that influence behavior
to

perform the

Mandler

inaccessible,

one's ability

(i.e.

task).

In addition to the propositional, symbolic and procedural systems of

representation, a fourth, alternative system also has been proposed.

systems just discussed, representations
exist at

any one discrete place

characteristics such as being

in

In contrast to the

in the distributed, or connectionist,

memory, nor do they have

composed of images, words,

system do not

distinct, descriptive

propositions, etc.

Representations in this system instead consist of patterns of activity across homogenous,
neuron-like units distributed throughout the brain (Rumelhart

& Norman,

1988; Mandler,

1998). These patterns are initiated and strengthened by one's direct perception of objects

and events

in the

environment. At a

those objects and events that

first

later time, they

may

be re-activated

in the

absence of

produced them, thereby constituting representations.

5

For instance,

in the previously described
scenario

gas station, our representation of the route
that

we

of providing directions to the
nearest
described would have involved a
re-

activation of the patterns of brain activity
that initially were produced
during an actual
trip

along that route. Similarly, our representations
of the furniture located

darkened room would have involved a re-activation
of the patterns of brain

produced by our

initial

in the

activity

perception of this furniture.

Perhaps most pertinent to our opening scenarios of
providing directions
nearest gas station and navigating through a darkened

room

is

to the

a fifth and final

representational system, namely, the analogical system.
According to Rumelhart and

Norman

(1988), analogical representations involve a correspondence between
the

represented and representing worlds which

is

as direct as possible, that

is,

they do not

involve complex symbols or words which "stand" for objects and
events. As Mandler

(1998) pointed out, analogical representations

initially

were considered

to

be mental

"images" or "pictures" of certain objects and events, however, she has expanded
system

to include

"image-schemas". According

to her,

image schemas

this

are "spatial

representations" which are abstracted from one's perceptual analysis of a given object or
event. Essentially, she argued that

we come

to pick out selected aspects of highly

complex perceptual objects and events and put them
For example, seeing an object being placed

into simpler,

into a cup,

more

abstract forms.

one might develop a

representation of "containment" (Mandler, 1998). While this representation does not

correspond explicitly to a specific object or event,

it still is

information that has been

extracted and stored. Based on this line of reasoning, Mandler (1998) maintained that

6

such "conscious re-constructions" of information
extracted through perceptual analysis
constitute analogical representations.

If

image-schemas are

logical that the

to

be considered analogical representations,
then

Gibsonian concept of affordances also would be
considered

representational system.

As Gibson and Pick (1998)

it

seems

part of this

define them, affordances are those

properties of the environment that are related to one's
capabilities for action. In other

words, affordances involve those actions for which a given
object allows. This may
involve any

clear that

if

number of actions,

we can evoke

including an object's graspability, movability,

etc.,.

information regarding the affordances of given objects

absence of those objects themselves, then

we would be

It IS

in the

able to use this information to

guide our actions and reason about those objects. Consequently,

it

can be argued that

stored information regarding the affordances of given objects must be considered
part of

one's representational system.

From our

perspective,

if

re-descriptions of objects and

events into abstract concepts through perceptual analysis are to be considered part of the
analogical system of representations, then so too should one's stored information

regarding the affordances of objects.

Can Young
In defining representations

adults

do indeed

Yet while

when

it

is

rely

Infants

and

on representations

Form Representations?

their role in cognition,

to reason

about objects and events

apparent that adults can form representations,

this ability first develops.

At the heart of

we have assumed

this

debate

much debate

lies

in the

that

world.

exists over

the Piagetian concept of

object permanence, or the knowledge that objects continue to exist even

when

they are

not visible. According to Piaget (1954), infants are not able to form representations of

7

absent objects and events until they have developed
object permanence. In the standard
Piagetian test of this concept, a desirable toy

is

placed under a cloth while the infant

watches. Piaget discovered that prior to 8-10
months of age, infants in

this situation

not remove the cloth in order to obtain the toy;
he inferred that they behave as
object

hidden

no longer
in this

exists.

Infants' failure to intentionally search for

manner was

interpreted

by Piaget

if

do

the

and locate objects

as clear evidence that "out of sight

is

out

of mind" and that infants younger than 8-10 months of age simply
are incapable of

forming a representation.

While the standard Piagetian

test

of object permanence necessitates the ability to

represent a hidden object and use the information contained in that representation
to

reason about and guide one's actions,

it

also involves a detailed series of motor actions

described by Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (1985) as means-end behavior. As
Baillargeon et

al.

characterized

it,

means-end behavior requires one

of actions in order to produce a desirable end

result.

For example,

Piagetian task just described, the infant must coordinate an
cloth with a subsequent reach to obtain the toy.

possible that infants

to

fail this test

initial

As Baillargeon

In order to investigate infants' abilities to

them

to

in the

standard

reach to remove the

et al.

pointed out,

it

is

of object permanence simply because they are not able

produce means-end behavior and not because they are unable

requiring

to coordinate a series

form and

to

form representations.

utilize representations

produce means-end behavior, Baillargeon

et al.

without

(1985) introduced the

dishabituation paradigm. In a set of studies employing this paradigm, infants were

habituated to a "drawbridge" being rotated through 180°

(i.e.

resting position to a 90° upright position, and then lowered

8

being raised from a

backward

flat,

to a final, flat

resting position).

Once

drawbridge and directly

shown a

infants habituated to this event, a
block
in its

was placed behind

the

path before the drawbridge was raised.
Infants then were

possible and an impossible event. In the
possible event, the drawbridge rotated

through only

12°, until

1

it

was stopped by

the

box lying behind

it.

In the impossible

event, the drawbridge rotated through the full 180°
despite the fact that the box

apparently was lying behind
that infants as

event.

young

it.

as 3 Vi to

They maintained

Baillargeon et

al.

(1985) and Baillargeon (1987) found

4 months of age dishabituated only

that this

was due

to the impossible

to the factor of "surprise"; infants

surprised at the occurrence of the impossible event and therefore
spent
at

it.

Based on

this line

drawbridge was raised. In other words, 3

box and

its

more time looking

of reasoning, Baillargeon and colleagues argued that infants
were

able to reason that the box continued to exist even though

the

were

V2 to

it

was occluded

as the

4 month old infants were able

position in the absence of direct perceptual information

(i.e.

to represent

without

vision of the box) and use this information to reason about the events currently being

perceived

(i.e.

whether the event was possible or impossible).

In a second dishabituation study examining object permanence in 6

infants sat in front of a track that

shown a toy

was

partially

event, the screen

occluded by a screen. They then were

it

moved

along a continuous path. Once infants habituated

was lowered and they were shown a box being placed

or slightly behind the track on which the car traveled.

set in

olds,

car that traveled along the track, disappearing and then reappearing from

behind the screen as

was

month

The screen was

to this

either directly on

lifted

and the car

motion once again. Infants again were shown a possible and an impossible

event. In the possible event, the car re-emerged from behind the screen only

9

when

the

box was placed behind

the track. In the impossible event,
the car re-emerged

behind the screen when the box was placed on the

move
that 6

this

right through the

box which

from

track; in this case, the car appeared
to

laid in its path (Baillargeon,
1986). Baillargeon

month olds dishabituated only

to the impossible event,

event "surprised" them. She argued that infants

found

once again suggesting

in this situation

that

remembered not

only that the car existed, but also that the track and the box
existed, even though these
objects were occluded by the screen. Furthermore, Baillargeon
maintained that infants

were able
fact that

to represent the location of the

it

was occluded. Once

again,

it

box

(i.e.

on or behind the

as

appeared as

if

infants

track) despite the

were able

to represent

objects and their locations in the absence of those objects themselves and
use this

information to reason about the scenario

at

hand

at a

younger age than Piaget (1954)

suggested.

While the

studies

employing the dishabituation paradigm just described do

provide us with interesting information, the suggestion that

it is

necessary to infer deeper,

cognitive processes to explain the behavior in a basic looking task raises an important
question: "Are the conclusions drawn from these studies warranted?". According to

researchers including Bogartz, Shinskey, and Speaker (1997), the answer

maintained that infants dishabituate to impossible events
described

(i.e.

Baillargeon et

al.,

is,

"No". They

in studies similar to those just

1985; Baillargeon, 1986, 1987) solely on the basis of

perceptual novelty and familiarity effects; infants' knowledge regarding the possibility

and/or impossibility of these events does not play a

role.

In their analyses of studies employing the dishabituation paradigm, Bogartz and

Shinskey (1998) pointed out

that the impossible

10

and possible events presented

in

many

of

these studies are confounded with perceptual
similarities and differences between
these

events and the

by Baillargeon

initial

habituation events. For example, in the
previously described study

et al. (1985),

a drawbridge was rotated through 180°
during both the

habituation and impossible test events.

As

a result, the impossible event

was

perceptually identical to the habituation event and therefore
should have been familiar to
infants.

On

the other hand, since the drawbridge

was

rotated through only

1

12° during

the possible test event, this event should have been perceptually
novel to infants.
Clearly, the possible and impossible test events in this and
similar studies are confounded

with whether or not the given event

is

perceptually similar or different from the

habituation event.

According

to

Bogartz and Shinskey (1998), researchers employing the

dishabituation paradigm often rely on the confounding of possible and impossible

events with perceptual familiarity and novelty in interpreting their

results.

test

Assuming

that

infants generally look longer at novel than familiar stimuli, researchers including

Baillargeon and colleagues

if

(i.e.

Baillargeon et

al.,

1985; Baillargeon, 1987) reasoned that

the looking patterns of infants rely solely on perceptual cues, then infants should look

longer

at the possible,

novel events than the familiar, impossible ones. The fact that

infants look longer at the perceptually familiar, impossible events than at the perceptually

novel, possible events in dishabituation studies such as those by Baillargeon

and Baillargeon (1987) therefore was taken

as evidence that infants

occurrence of the impossible events and therefore look longer
perceptually novel ones.

More

importantly, this surprise

11

was

at

et al.

(1985)

were surprised by the

these events than at the

interpreted as being the

direct

consequence of

infants' abilities to represent

and reason about unseen objects and

events.

While

the line of reasoning just described does
provide one possible explanation

for the results obtained

by Baillargeon

et al.

(1985) and Baillargeon (1987), Bogartz and

Shinskey (1998) suggested an equally plausible one. They
maintained

that the fact that

infants look longer at the perceptually familiar, impossible
event than at the perceptually

novel, impossible event

this situation

is

solely indicative of perceptual familiarity effects;
infants in

simply prefer to look

at the

of reasoning, Bogartz and colleagues

1998) maintained that Baillargeon

perceptually familiar event. Based on this line

(i.e.

Bogartz

et al.,

1987; Bogartz

& Shinskey,

(1985) and Baillargeon's (1987) conclusions

et al.

regarding infants' abilities to represent hidden objects are not supported by their
data. In
general, since the impossible and possible events are confounded with perceptual
familiarity

and novelty, they argued

and cognition

that

in these studies in order to

it

simply

is

not possible to tease apart perception

determine whether infants are able to represent

and reason about unseen objects and events.
It is

important to note that while the perceptual familiarity effects explanation

offered by Bogartz

& Shinskey (1998) may account for the fact that infants looked

significantly longer at the impossible versus the possible events in the drawbridge studies

of Baillargeon

et al.

(1985) and Baillargeon (1987), these effects do not explain the

previously described results reported by Baillargeon (1986), as well as other, similar

studies.

For instance,

impossible events

in contrast to the

in the

drawbridge experiment, both the possible and

study by Baillargeon (1986) were perceptually identical to each

other and to the habituation event.

As previously
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described, each of these events

involved a car traveling along a track, passing
behind an occluder, and re-emerging from

behmd

The only

that occluder.

difference between the possible and
impossible events

was whether a block was placed behind
raised and the car

was

set in

or directly onto the track before the occluder
was

motion. Consequently, once the car was set in
motion, both

the impossible and possible events should have been
perceptually familiar to the infants.
Overall, this fact, along with the fact that infants in this
study looked longer

at the

impossible versus the possible event, lends support to Baillargeon's
conclusion
infants

were able

to represent the occluded objects

that

and used these representations

to

reason about the possible and impossible events.

As

the above discussion illustrates, the conclusions drawn from the
dishabituation

studies presented here with regard to infants' abilities to represent unseen
objects and

events have sparked

toward

much

silent objects,

from these

debate. Studies investigating infants' reaching in the dark

however, lend additional support

to the

major conclusion draw

studies, namely, that infants are able to represent unseen objects

and events

at

a younger age than Piaget maintained. Like the dishabituation paradigm used by

Baillargeon and colleagues

(i.e.

Baillargeon et

reaching in the dark studies place infants

al.,

1985; Baillargeon, 1986, 1987),

in a situation in

which they must

rely

on

their

representations of objects while removing the need for means-end behavior. Unlike the

passive looking situation of the dishabituation paradigm, however, this situation requires
infants to perform an action

(i.e.

a reach toward the

remembered

location of an object) in

order to demonstrate their knowledge of an object's existence and position

(Clifton, 1998).
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in

space

In an early reaching in the dark study,
Wishart,

Bower, and Dunkeld (1978)

presented 4 to 12 month old infants with a silent
object
left

in the light either to their right
or

while preventing them from reaching for the
object. The lights then were turned

and the infants were allowed
infants reached to the

to reach freely.

Wishart

remembered position of the

et al.

found that

at

off,

5 months of age,

object that they had seen in the light,

even after delays of up to 90 seconds between the

lights

being extinguished and their

first

reaches. Furthermore, infants in this study often engaged in
intermediate activity,

ranging from "looking" around the room to crying, when the lights
infants reached to the

activity,

Wishart

remembered

et al.

first

went

position of the object even after engaging in this

concluded that as young as 5 months of age, infants can remember

not only that an object continues to exist in the dark, but they also can remember
location in space.

Since

out.

Once

again, the age at

which Piaget

initially

its

suggested infants achieve

permanence was challenged.

object

The

findings initially uncovered by Wishart et

subsequent study by

Hood and

In

an additional control condition,

which they were not shown objects
an object

infants

in the light, the lights

were allowed

target region

(i.e.

to reach.

(1978) were replicated

Willatts (1986). In this study, 5

presented with an object in the light either to their

restrained.

al.

left

infants

in the light.

month old

infants

were

or right while their hands were

were given no-object

trials

during

After being presented/not presented with

were extinguished, the object was removed and

Hood and

in a

Willatts found that infants reached

the

more

to the

the area immediately surrounding the object's location in the light) than

the non-target regions (the areas opposite the one surrounding the object's location in the

light)

on object

trials.

Like Wishart

et al..

Hood and
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Willatts also found that infants

reached into the correct target area
lights

after

having "looked" away from

were extinguished. Based on these

results,

that area

once the

they concluded that infants had
formed

enduring representations of objects and their locations

in the light

which

later influenced

their reaching in the dark.

While
initially

and

infants' reaching behaviors in studies such
as the ones just described

appear to provide convincing evidence that infants are
able

their locations, several

problems do

exist.

For instance,

if

5

to represent objects

month old

infants are

able to store representations of objects and their locations,
then the infants in the study by

Hood

& Willatts (1986) should have had little reason to reach on no-object trials.

same

time,

for

them

only.

if

infants in this study truly did

in the dark,

Hood and

then their

first

know where

the objects

At the

were when reaching

reaches should have been directed to the target areas

Willatts reported that infants in their study reached equally often
during

the object versus the no-object

trials.

The only

difference between these

infants reached to both of the non-target regions

equally often during the no-object

trials,

(i.e.

the areas to their

but increased their

trials

left

number of reaches

target area while decreasing those to the non-target area during the object

Furthermore, infants'

first

and

was

that

right)

to the

trials.

reaches were as likely to be directed to the target as the non-

target areas during the object trials.

Taken

together, these facts cast doubt on the

conclusions drawn from this study.

While

the problems with the reaching in the dark studies just discussed

results a bit

ambiguous, there are explanations for these

that infants

simply cannot form representations. For example,

the study

by Hood and

results other than the

it

is

make

their

argument

possible that infants in

Willatts (1986) were uncertain as to the existence of an object in

15

the dark during the no-object

immediately before the

trials.

Just because an object

lights are extinguished

nothing interesting to reach out for

is

not present in the light

might not signify to an infant

in the dark.

This especially

is

exploring their surrounding area

trials.

in the

As

a result, infants simply

that in a related study,

McCall

means-end task involving a toy under
in the

trials.

a cover that

It is

had

light.

to

be opened

were tested

in the dark.

McCall and Clifton

uncertainty about the toy being under the cover from

in a

Infants

directed toward the target areas in the study by

Hood

trial to trial.

were not always

& Willatts (1986),

note that similar reaching in the dark studies have found infants'

overwhelmingly toward the correct location of the object seen

& Clifton,

attributed the lack

trials to infants'

to the fact that infants' first reaches in the dark

Goubet

trials,

interesting to note

In this study, infants

of different frequencies of reaching on no-object versus object

Clifton, 1988;

may have been

dark regardless of whether they had seen the experimenter

hide the toy before closing the cover in the

With regard

various

& Clifton (1998) also found that infants reached in the

dark as often during object versus no-object

searched for the toy

at

dark with their reaches during the no-object

rather than reaching for a specific object in a specific
location.

is

possible considering

the fact that the infants in this study had been
presented with an object

locations in the light on previous

that there

first

it

is

important to

reaches to be

in the light (e.g. Perris

1998). Furthermore, while the fact that infants'

&

first

reaches in the dark were equally likely to be directed toward the target versus the non-

target areas in the study

by Hood and Willatts (1986) may seem puzzling,

remains that infants repeatedly reached toward the target areas on object
searching for an object that they remembered seeing
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in that location.

the fact

trials as if

If infants

simply

could not represent objects and their locations

at this age,

then there should have been an

equal amount of reaching to both the target and
non-target locations on both object and
no-object

trials.

trials clearly

The

fact that infants repeatedly reached

suggests that

some

toward the target area on object

sort of stored information, or representation,

must have

influenced the direction of infants' subsequent reaches
in the dark.

What Do

Infants

Rep resenf^

Despite the criticisms presented here, the results of studies
employing the
dishabituation and reaching in the dark paradigms clearly suggest
that infants younger

than 8-10 months of age have

at least

some

ability to store information

and use

this

information to guide their future actions. Yet while the dishabituation and
reaching
the dark studies just discussed attempt to answer the question,

"Can

representations?", they do not adequately address the question,

infants

in

form

"What information

is

contained in these representations?". Additional studies examining infants' reaching

in

the dark toward sounding objects attempt to answer just this question.
In a study

with a

by

Perris

and Clifton (1988), 6

rattle at five positions: mid-line,

finger puppet

infants.

was attached

During a

five positions

series of

head

left

infants

and

right.

were presented

A Big Bird

to the rattle with

Velcro and could be removed easily by the

warm-up

the light, the rattle

and advanced

at mid-line,

month old

30° and 60° to their

trials in

to within reach of the infant, at

out and obtain the puppet. After the warm-up

infant's

Vi to 7

turned off the

lights,

trials,

was shaken

each of the

which point s/he could reach

an experimenter centered the

and began

to

shake the

rattle at

five locations within the infant's reach. Perris and Clifton reported that
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at

77%

one of the

percent of

the infants reached in the dark for the
object, with
the target area

(i.e.

In general,

the

of their

first

reaches going into

the area immediately surrounding the
rattle and toy).

two

On one

are possible.

75%

interpretations of the results obtained by Ferris
and Clifton (1988)

hand,

may be argued

it

sound cues emitted from the

rattle to

that infants in this study

were able

to utilize

represent the location of the rattle and toy
in

three-dimensional space. Furthermore, since they were unable
to see their hands while

reaching in the dark,

it

also

may be

of their hands relative to the
Ferris

and Clifton pointed

engaging

in a

this activity

rattle

argued that infants were able

and toy

(Ferris

& Clifton).

out, these results simply

grasping and playing activity

during the warm-up

trials in

in the

the light.

may have

On

to represent the location

the other hand, as

indicated that infants were

dark based on their remembrance of

As

they suggested, since infants

reached toward the location of the sound rather than to random positions

remembrance may have been
reaching behavior elicited in

infants' abilities to utilize

locations.

tied to the sound.

this

According

in space, this

to this line of reasoning, the

study might not have been the direct consequence of

sound cues

to

develop representations of objects and

their

important to note, however, that according to the definition presented

It is

here, linking the

sound of the

rattle to

general grasping and playing activities would

constitute a representation; infants in this study

would have stored information regarding

the link between reaching activity and the rattle sound and used this information to guide

their

behavior

(i.e.

reaching toward the sound

in the dark).

In addition to representing the location of a sounding object in space, studies by

Clifton, Ferris,

can

utilize

and Bullinger (1991) and Litovsky and Clifton (1992) suggest

sound cues

to

that infants

determine whether objects are within or beyond reach. For
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instance, Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger
presented 6 Vi to 7

combination similar

to the

month olds with a

rattle/toy

one just described. After presenting infants
with the

toy in the light during several warm-up
dark, either to their right or

left

trials, infants

were presented with the

and either within or beyond reach. Clifton,

rattle in the

Perris,

Bullinger found that infants reached more toward the
correct location of the toy

dark

when

was presented within

it

rather than

Litovsky and Clifton replicated these

sounding objects

in the

beyond

their reach.

results, finding that infants

rattling

and

in the

In a follow-up study,

reached more toward

dark presented within versus beyond reach even when
sound-

pressure level cues were removed. Taken together, these studies
clearly suggest that
infants can use

sound cues

to represent the distance

and azimuthal location of

invisible

objects.

One key

question that arises in the Perris and Clifton (1988), Clifton, Perris, and

Bullinger (1991) and Litovsky and Clifton (1992) studies just described
infants

were reaching for the

sounds.

As

Stack, Muir, Sheriff, and

Roman

laboratory. In their study, 2 through 7

(1989) found, infants will reach for sounds

to associate with a particular object in the

month old

infants

were presented with

of invisible auditory rattles and glowing egg-shaped objects

at

4 through 7 months of age,

producing the auditory

rattle

trial

in the dark.

trial

Stack

blocks

et al.

infants reached toward the invisible object

sounds on more than

50%

Furthermore, they found that there was no difference

auditory

whether

actual objects themselves or simply toward the presented

which they never have had the opportunity

found that

is

of the

in the

trials

presented.

amount of reaching when

blocks were presented before instead of after the visual
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trial

blocks.

As

the

a

result,

they concluded that infants' reaching did not
depend on their ability to associate

the rattle sounds with a particular object in the
laboratory.

The

willingness of infants to reach toward a sound
that has not been paired with a

particular object in the light in the laboratory also
has been demonstrated

and McCall (1999). In

Perris,

rattle/toy

combination

was allowed

this study,

in the light.

one group of

infants

was allowed

A second group of infants (i.e.

Clifton,

to reach for a

the no-sound group)

to reach only for silent objects in the light. Finally,
infants in a third, social-

interaction group

were not presented with objects

in the light at all, rather, they

played with an experimenter for a comparable amount of time. During
in all three

by

groups were presented with

rattle

sounds within reach and

simply

test trials, infants

at

a variety of

positions in the dark. According to Clifton, Perris, and McCall, infants in
both the no-

sound and social-interaction groups reached toward the

who were

presented with the rattle/toy combinations in the

et al. (1989), this study

More

rattle

once again demonstrated

sounds as often as infants

light.

Like the study by Stack

that infants will reach for

sound alone.

importantly, these studies provide evidence for the possibility that infants in the

studies

by

Perris

and Clifton (1988),

Clifton, Perris,

and Bullinger (1991), and Litovsky

and Clifton (1992) may have been reaching simply toward sounds, and not toward

their

representations of given objects.

In order to test the hypothesis that infants in the above studies were simply

reaching toward sounds and not represented objects, Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, and Perris

(1991) presented 6

them

V2

month old

infants with both large and small hoops and allowed

to reach for these objects in the light.

bell or rattle

sounds

in

Each object was presented with

either jingle

such a manner that one type of sound specified the large object
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and the other specified the small
large

and small sounding objects

object.

and small objects

in

al.

in

trials

of reaching for the

were presented with these sounding

found evidence of

differential reaching styles

both the light and dark conditions. As they
reported,

infants often reached for the small object with one

hands

warm-up

in the light, infants

objects in the dark. Clifton, Rochat, et
for the large

After eight

hand and the large object with both

both the light and the dark. Furthermore,

placements on the large object, Clifton, Rochat,

in

et al.

an examination of infants' hand

found that infants reached around

the entire perimeter of the large object, and not just toward the
sound device located
the top of this object during both the light and dark

Taken

trials.

together, the results of the study just described suggest that infants
can

develop an association between particular sounds and types of objects and can use
information to guide their behavior.

sound

itself,

If infants in this

The

fact that infants'

was

located,

hand placements on the

perimeter of the object demonstrates that infants in
for the

study were reaching

this

strictly for the

then their hand placements on the large object should have been clustered

the top of the object, where the sound device

perimeter.

at

sound

itself.

and large objects

at

and not around the object's

large object included the entire

this study

were not reaching

strictly

Furthermore, the fact that infants reached differentially for the small

in the

dark suggests that they were able to associate the specific objects

with their respective sounds.

More

importantly, this result suggests that they used this

information to guide their reaching when they could only hear but not see the objects for

which they were reaching
Rochat, et

al.

concluded

(Clifton, Rochat, et

that infants

al.).

Based on these

results, Clifton,

can represent the shape and graspability of an unseen

object and utilize this information to guide their reaching in the dark.
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In

drawing conclusions about what types of
information are included

representations of sounding objects in the dark,

sounds used

it

is

in infants'

important to note that the continuous

to signal the presence of objects in the
dark in the studies just described

provided infants with on-going perceptual cues. As

is

clear, infants in these studies

were

not evoking representations of given objects or events in
the complete absence of
perceptual information, rather, they were receiving on-going
perceptual support from

As

these sounds.

object

a result, the suggestion that the infants in these studies
have achieved

permanence and therefore

are capable of forming representations

is

debatable.

In order to deal with the question of whether infants are able to
represent objects

and events

in the

complete absence of on-going perceptual information, Goubet and

Clifton (1998) designed a situation that required infants to utilize their representations
of

an event while receiving no such support. In
vertical

wooden tube with wooden pegs

light, plastic ball

these

wooden

was dropped through

remaining portions being covered with
traveled part of the

way down

it

initial

felt.

was developed. When

made

a series of sounds as

toward a tray located

a

it

hit

at his/her

mid-line.

portions of these chutes, with the

As

a result, the ball produced sounds only as

these chutes, traveling silently the remainder of the

way

landing in one of the trays.

Goubet and Clifton (1998) presented 6
trials in

inside

ball to a final resting position in a tray positioned either to the right or

pegs were attached only to the

until silently

its

the tube, the ball

of the infant, and a third which directed

Wooden

it

attached to

an apparatus consisting of a

pegs. Attached to the end of this tube were three additional chutes, two of

which directed the
left

this study,

V2

month olds with

a series of eight light

order to familiarize them with the apparatus just described. In the side-
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experience group, infants saw and heard the ball traveling

down

the tube and chutes and

arriving at their left on four of the trials and at their
right on the remainder of the

the center chute

other hand,

saw and heard

mid-line; the

trials.

was hidden during

two

these

trials.

The mid-line group of

its

side chutes were hidden

from the

infants in this group during these

respective tray. At the end of the familiarization

extinguished and both groups were presented with a series of

landed either to their right or to their

down

left.

During these

the vertical tube and part of the

Finally, there

on the

the ball traveling only through the tube and
chute at his/her

All infants were encouraged to reach out and obtain the
ball once

available in

travel

infants,

trials;

was a period of silence

trials,

way down one

trials,

trials

it

became

the lights were

during which the ball

the infants heard the ball

of the two side chutes.

as the ball traveled into the appropriate side tray

and became available for pick-up.

Goubet and Clifton (1998) found
line

groups initiated their

tray, that is, several

first

that infants in both the side-experience

reaches in the dark only after the ball had landed

seconds after the sound cues had stopped. Infants

spent an equivalent amount of time searching for the

ball,

in

(i.e.

first

in the side-

the silent area of the

apparatus and the area of the tray in which the ball was located) more often

than infants in mid-line group. In addition, infants

in the side-experience

in the

mid-line group.
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dark

group whose

reaches were into an incorrect area of the apparatus were more likely to

subsequent corrective reaches toward the correct location of the

in the

both groups also

however, infants

experience group reached into the correct area of the apparatus

and mid-

initiate

ball than infants in the

Taken

make

together, the results of the study by

Goubet and CHfton (1998) led them

to

several interesting points regarding infants'
representations. First, the fact that

infants waited several seconds before initiating
their first reach, along with the fact that

the side-experience group reached significantly

more toward

the silent than the sounding

parts of the apparatus, suggested that infants did not
need on-going perceptual support to

guide their reaches toward the correct location of the
taken as further evidence that infants

These

ball.

who have formed

results also can

be

associations between particular

sounds and objects really are reaching for the objects, and not simply toward
sounds.
addition, since both groups spent the

same amount of time searching

appeared as

were able

if

infants in both groups

absence of on-going perceptual support

(i.e.

for the ball,

In

it

to represent the existence of the ball in the

in silence).

The

fact that the side-experience

group reached into the correct target area more often than the mid-line group suggested
that while both groups

knew

that the ball existed in the dark, only the side-experience

group was able to form a useful representation of the apparatus
group, the event of the ball traveling

down

in the light.

the chutes in the dark

matched

For

this

their

representations of this event in the light. Consequently, infants in the side-experience

group had a useful representation on which
dark.

The

conflict

between the

light

when

searching for the ball in the

and dark events experienced by the mid-line group,

on the other hand, might explain why
ball in the dark.

to rely

this

group appeared

to

Infants in the mid-line group simply had no

have trouble locating the

way

to interpret the

sound

cues which indicated the ball's path because they did not have a similar experience

light

which could be called upon

to guide their search for the ball in the dark

Clifton).
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in the

(Goubet

&

The

ability of

6 Vi month old infants to represent the type of event
presented by

Goubet and Clifton (1998) opens
might infants be able

to represent?".

with a study demonstrating 7

means-ends task

in the

Vi to 8 Vi

month old

that

opened

box and closed

pushed

to within reach of the infant.

and s/he was allowed
the

was emitted from

warm-up

trials,

to

make

infants

the experimenter close the

was

started, the lights

this study, infants

box was a speaker with a toy

open the box with one reach and obtain
trials,

the speaker inside the

Once

the infant

the toy

the experimenter placed the toy in

the door over the toy while the infant watched.

closed, a rattle sound

this question

infants' abilities to represent an entire

to the side. Inside the

with a subsequent reach. In a series of warm-up
the

other types of tasks

McCall and Clifton (1998) answered

Essentially, infants could

it.

"What

absence of on-going perceptual support. In

were shown a hinged box
attached to

the door to the question,

Once

box and

the door

the entire

was

box was

opened the box, the sound stopped

a second reach for the toy in silence. At the conclusion of

were given a

box

series of test trials during

either over the toy or over an

which they watched

empty

space.

The sound

were extinguished and the box then was pushed within reach of

the

infant.

McCall and Clifton (1998) found
a

first

toy.

on

70%

of the dark

trials, infants

who made

reach for the apparatus and opened the box also made a second reach to obtain the

If,

as

and events

some have
in the

have assumed

suggested, infants are not able to form representations of objects

absence of on-going perceptual support, infants

that the

box and toy no longer existed once

therefore should have had

The

that

little

in this

study should

the sound stopped and

reason to produce a subsequent reach to obtain the toy.

fact that infants reached for the toy after opening the
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box without being able

to see

either the toy or their actions as they

opened the box suggests

that they

were able

to

represent the set-up of the apparatus as well as
the existence and position of the toy
relative to themselves

and

to the box.

More

impressively, infants in this situation must

have been able to represent the invisible displacement
of the
been able to reason

(McCall

that

once the box was pushed forward

toy, that

is,

in the dark, so

they must have

was

the toy

& Clifton).

Taken

together, the results of the studies described here lead to
several

conclusions regarding the types of information contained in infants'
representations of
objects and events. Studies by Perris and Clifton (1988), Clifton, Perris,
and Bullinger

(1991) and Litovsky and Clifton (1992) suggest that once infants have formed an
association between objects and their particular sounds, they can utilize this information
to represent the locations of those objects in three-dimensional space. Furthermore,
since

infants are unable to see their hands

when reaching

for objects in the dark, these studies

also suggest that infants can represent the position of their hands relative to the objects

for

which they

are reaching (Clifton, 1998). Similarly, Clifton, Rochat, et

al.

(1991)

demonstrated that once an association between an object and a sound has been formed,
infants can represent the shape and graspability of that object

its

when presented only

with

sound. Finally, studies by Goubet and Clifton (1998) and McCall and Clifton (1998)

demonstrated that infants can represent entire events and means-ends tasks and use these
representations to reason about the existence and location of the objects involved even in

the absence of on-going perceptual support.
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Plaguing Probl ems and Possible Exp lan;<tinn^
Is It

the

Sound

As

or Is

It

the Object?

previously suggested, the question of whether or
not infants really "know"

what they are reaching
the dark literature.

for in the dark

While

studies

(i.e.

a particular object) has plagued the reaching
in

by Perris

& Clifton

(1988) Clifton, Perris, and

Bullinger (1991), Litovsky and Clifton (1992), Clifton, Rochat,
Clifton (1998) and

McCall and Clifton (1998)

all

suggest that the infants in these studies

were reaching for represented objects rather than random sounds, the
infants also are willing to reach for sounds

with particular objects (Stack

et al.,

Goubet and

et al. (1991),

fact

remains

which they have not been trained

1989; Clifton, Perris

& McCall,

that

to associate

1999). This

willingness automatically calls into question any conclusions regarding infants'
representations of unseen objects drawn from the reaching in the dark studies presented
here.

Can
in the

representations be used to explain

why

infants reach toward sounding objects

dark even when they have not been trained to associate these sounds with

particular objects? Stack et

al.

(1989) suggested that the answer to

"Yes". They assumed that infants

who

sounds as objects. Accordingly, infants

McCall (1999)

studies

this question

is,

reach toward "invisible sounds" perceive these

in

both the Stack

must have had some

et al.

and Clifton,

sort of representation

Perris,

which linked

and

particular

objects with the presented sounds in these studies in order to guide their reaches. Yet

while this line of reasoning seems plausible, several questions remain.

infants

who

Why

would

are presented with sounds in the dark assume that these sounds signify

objects without

first

being trained

in the light to associate those
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sounds with particular

objects? Furthermore, what types of objects would
they associate with those sounds?
Finally,

what information would be contained

in infants' representations of those

sounding objects?

One

hint to answering these three questions

may

lie in

the types of sounds used in

the reaching in the dark studies presented here. For instance,
in both the Stack et

(1989) and Clifton, Perris,

sounds

in the dark.

more than
result,

came

it is

Since

likely that

& McCall (1999) studies, infants were presented with rattle
rattles are

most

infants

extremely

possible that infants in the Stack et

infants in the Stack et

al.

for a "graspable object"

rattles

and the sounds

The argument
McCall (1999)
sounds

(1991).

and Clifton,

in their

Perris,

it is

homes. As a

and McCall studies

is

and

(i.e.

general as graspable objects. Consequently, the

Perris, Clifton,

a

rattle)

and McCall studies may have been reaching

based on their previously developed representations

that they produce.

that infants in the Stack et

studies

were guided by

suggested by the

As previously

two warm-up

made

al.

toys in our society,

into the laboratory with a well-developed association between the sounds
of a rattle
rattle or rattles in

rattle

common baby

have played with these toys

and either a particular

of

al.

set

(1989) and Clifton, Perris, and

their representations of objects associated with

of studies conducted by Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger

described, 6 V2 to 7

trials in the light

al.

month olds

in

one of these studies received

during which they were presented with an object that

a rattle sound. In a second study, the sound of the object was changed to a series of

computer-generated "pips". Following only two warm-up
with these sounds in the dark. In the

first

trials,

infants

were presented

study, Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger found that

infants presented with the rattle sounds reached on approximately
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59%

of the dark

trials

in

which the object was placed within

reach. In the second study, however,
infants

who

were presented with the computer-generated "pips" reached
on only 31% of the dark
trials in

which the sound was presented within
Initially, Clifton, Perris,

just described

reach.

& Bullinger (1991) suggested that the pattern of results

may have been due

to the fact that the

computer-generated sounds were

hard to localize or were less appealing to the infants than the

second explanation involving

two warm-up

infants' representations

trials in the light

many

infants

may

plausible.

sounds; however, a

It is

possible that the

simply did not provide infants with enough experience

develop an association between these objects and
case,

is

rattle

their respective sounds. This being the

not have developed representations of the sounding objects

presented in these studies on which they could rely to guide their reaching

Assuming

to

that the computer-generated pips

heard these sounds in the dark

may have

no representation of the type of object

were novel sounds

in the dark.

for the infants, those

who

reached infrequently simply because they had

(i.e.

graspable or not graspable) producing those

unusual sounds.

On

have relied upon

their past experiences with rattles outside of the laboratory to guide their

the other hand, infants

who

heard the

rattle

sounds

in the

reaching in the dark. In general, the establishment of representations of
graspable objects outside of the laboratory

more frequently toward
According

between the

may

explain

why

dark

may

rattles as

infants in this study reached

the rattle versus the computer-generated sounds.

to the representation hypothesis just described, the apparent conflict

results

uncovered by Stack

et al.

(1999) and the conclusions reached by Perris

(1989) and Clifton, Perris, and McCall

& Clifton

(1988) Clifton, Perris, and

Bullinger (1991), Litovsky and Clifton (1992), Clifton, Rochat,
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et al. (1991),

Goubet and

Clifton (1998), and

would appear

as

sounding objects
this

McCall and Clifton (1998) would be

infants in each of these studies

if

reconcilable. Essentially,

were relying on

their representations of

to guide their reaches in the dark.
Furthermore, if supported

hypothesis would

make

it

it

by

data,

clear that infants are capable of forming
representations of

objects and events and do rely on these representations
to guide their behavior.

The

Classical Conditioning

Arg ument

In addition to the question of whether infants in the
reaching in the dark studies

presented here were reaching toward sounds or actual objects, the
question of whether
their reaches

we have

were

classically conditioned in the light also has plagued these
studies.

As

seen in most of the reaching in the dark studies discussed here, infants
always

were presented with a number of training
with the apparatus, sounds, objects,

etc.

trials in the light in

and

to train

them

certain objects or events. During these familiarization

order to familiarize them

to associate given

trials, infants

sounds with

consistently were

presented with sounding objects for a short period of time before actually reaching for
those objects (Perris

& Clifton,

Bullinger 1991; Litovsky

the sight of the toy

(i.e.

(i.e.

1988; Clifton, Rochat, et

& Clifton,

1992;

etc.).

al.,

In this situation,

in turn, led infants to

a conditioned response). Consequently,

can be argued that

it is

produce a reach for the toy

trained to emit a conditioned motor action

(i.e.

possible that infants were classically

conditioned to reach for the sounding objects during these

(i.e.

it

&

an unconditioned stimulus) was paired with the sound of the toy

a conditioned stimulus), which

objects

1991; Clifton, Perris,

(i.e.

they

may have been

a reach) in response to the sounds of the

the conditioned stimuli) (Clifton, Rochat, et

then the infants in the studies mentioned here simply
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trials;

al.,

1991). If this

may have been

was

the case,

producing a

conditioned motor response toward a sound rather than
executing a reach based on their
representations of the objects and events

at

hand.

While the conditioning argument just described provides
us with an
explanation for the results uncovered

in the

alternative

reaching in the dark studies presented here, a

careful analysis of these results suggests that infants' reaches
in the dark were
just simple conditioned responses. For example,

if

more than

infants in the Clifton, Perris, and

Bullinger (1991) and Litovsky and Clifton (1992) studies simply were
conditioned to

reach in response to any sound, then they should have reached equally
often during
in

which the object was presented beyond versus within

these conditions involved the

same sounds. The

reach, especially since both of

fact that infants reached

toward sounds presented within versus beyond reach suggests

were able
bodies

beyond or within

(Clifton, Perris,

An

often

that infants in this study

reach), as well as the affordance of reaching and grasping

and Bullinger).

analysis of infants' reaching patterns in the light and dark conditions of the

previously discussed study by Clifton, Rochat,

et al.

against the conditioning hypothesis just described.

for

more

to represent the location of the sounding objects in the dark in relation to their

(i.e.

Rochat, et

trials

al.

examined

which they reached

pointed out,

if

infants

infants'

in

(1991) provides further evidence

As mentioned

hand placements on the

previously, Clifton,

large and small sounding objects

both the light and dark conditions of their study. As they

had been conditioned

to reach differentially

toward these objects

the light, then their reaches in the dark should have had a similar, rigid morphology

compared

to their reaches in the light. In general, Clifton, Rochat, et

significant variability in the reaching positions used
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by

al.

in

when

(1991) found

infants in the light versus the dark

conditions of this study. Based on this result, they
concluded that infants' reaches

in the

dark were not merely the result of classical conditioning.

A final

line of

evidence against the conditioning hypothesis comes
from Goubet

and Clifton (1998) and McCall and Clifton (1998). As
previously mentioned, Goubet
and Clifton found

that infants waited for a period of

initiating their first reaches

reached toward the

silent

toward the apparatus

complete silence.

If infants'

infants should not

have waited

While

in their study.

in silence before

Furthermore, infants

and not the sounding parts of the apparatus. Likewise,

study by McCall and Clifton, infants

toward the apparatus

4 seconds or longer

in the

made

in the

a second reach toward the apparatus in

reaching in these studies had been conditioned, then the
to initiate their first reaches or

absence of the conditioned stimuli

made subsequent
(i.e.

reaches

the sounds).

the results of the studies just discussed provide evidence against the

conditioning hypothesis, there are various aspects of these studies which would

simultaneously allow a die-hard conditioning theorist to maintain that infants' reaches
these studies were conditioned. For example, Clifton, Rochat, et

infants used different types of reaches

(i.e.

object

was

in

the result of forward conditioning.

sized objects.

both the light and the dark conditions of

to obtain the large

and small

this perspective, infants

may have

could be argued that the type of reach used

been trained to

elicit differential

As

(1991) reported that

one versus two-handed reaches) when

reaching for the small versus the large object

their study. It

al.

in

From

reaches to the unique sounds produced by the different

a result, infants

may have produced

differential reaches in the dark

solely in response to the different sounds that they heard. Similarly, in the study by

McCall and Clifton (1998),

it is

possible that infants were conditioned to produce a series
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of motor actions

(i.e.

study. This

is

trials in this

study

a series of reaches) in response to the
sounds presented in this

especially plausible in light of the fact that
infants

(McCall

received no-object

they were shown the box being closed over
an empty space)

(i.e.

produced a second reach
trials

who

for the toy in the dark as often as those

& Clifton).

who

received object

Consequently, a die-hard conditioning theorist would
argue

that if infants in this study truly

had formed a representation of the event

prior to the lights being extinguished, then they should have had

second reach toward the apparatus

little

that occurred

reason to

elicit

a

to obtain the toy. Overall, if infants in the reaching
in

the dark studies described here were conditioned to produce a series of
motor actions as a
result of the pairing of

that these infants

may have been

sounds and motor actions during warm-up

were not relying on representations

(i.e.

then

it is

possible

to guide their behavior; they simply

executing a sequence of motor actions

responses) in response to a sound

trials,

a conditioned chain of

(i.e.

a conditioned stimulus).

The Current Study
Selecting a

Sound

In order to test the representation hypothesis that infants in the studies by Stack et

al.

(1989) and Clifton, Perris, and McCall (1999) were not reaching

in the

dark toward

the rattle sounds alone but were reaching based on their representations of the graspable

objects associated with these sounds,

reach for in the dark

graspable object.

infants

may have

It

when they have
was reasoned

we needed

to find a

sound

that infants

would not

not been given the opportunity to associate

that this

sound should

either be a familiar

it

sound

with a

that

heard outside of the laboratory but that would not be associated with a

graspable object or

it

should be a completely novel sound.
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Two

sounds, an electronic doorbell sound and
a computer-generated "chirping"

sound, were tested during piloting and parents were
asked whether these sounds

resembled any sound

found

40%

to elicit

that their infants

might have heard

at

comparably low amounts of reaching, with

of the dark

trials

home. Both sounds were

infants reaching

on

33%

versus

during which they were presented with the doorbell
and the

chirping sounds respectively. Furthermore, the majority of
parents reported that both

sounds should have been unfamiliar

to their infants. In the case of the doorbell sound,

even when parents did report owning a doorbell, the majority of them
maintained
their

home

that

doorbells did not sound similar to the doorbell sound heard in the
laboratory.

Since both sounds elicited comparably low levels of reaching

in the dark, the

question of whether to use only one or both of these sounds in the current study

remained. In answering

sounds that

may be

this question,

it is

important to note that while doorbells are

present in an infant's environment, infants simply do not have the

opportunity to grasp and tactually explore the sources of these sounds. As a

reasoned that even

in cases

not have associated

it

where the doorbell

is

result,

it

was

a familiar sound to infants, they should

with a graspable object outside of the laboratory. At the same time,

several parents pointed out during piloting that certain toys do produce sounds very

similar to the computer-generated chirping sound presented to their infants. In

mother reported owning one of these
that infants

who do own and

toys.

Based on

play with such toys

may

this information,

it

fact,

one

was reasoned

enter the laboratory with a

previously developed representation associating the chirping sound with a graspable

object, that

is,

a toy. In order to avoid

this possibility
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and based on the above

line of

reasoning regarding the doorbell, the doorbell sound
was selected as the sole stimulus for
the current study.

The Design
In the current study, infants

sound-experience group. Infants

were divided

into

in the silent-object

two groups, a

silent-object

and a

group received a series of

familiarization trials in the light during which they were
able to reach for and manipulate

only a silent object. Infants

in the

sound-experience group also received a series of

familiarization trials in the light during which they were encouraged
to reach for this

same

object.

object,

Once

however,

it

the infants in this group reached for and were manipulating this

produced a doorbell sound. Based on the

rationale described in the previous section,

it

was reasoned

familiarity with this sound, they should never have

results of piloting

and the

that regardless of infants'

had the opportunity

to associate

it

with a graspable object outside of the laboratory. For both groups, the purpose of these
familiarization trials

was

to ensure that infants

were willing

to

engage

behavior. For infants in the sound-experience group, however, these

in

reaching

trials also

provided

the opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a graspable object. Finally, infants

in

both groups were presented with the doorbell sound

trials

and were allowed

As

is

clear

from the design presented

here, infants in the silent-object group were

in the light,

potential for the forward conditioning of a motor action

to occur.

exposed

to a

test

to reach freely.

reaching for and manipulating only a silent object

sound

dark during subsequent

in the

At the same

(i.e.

thereby eliminating the

a reach) in response to a

time, however, infants in the sound-experience group were

sounding object during the familiarization
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trials.

As

a result, the classical

conditioning argument which has plagued previous
reaching

have been a problem for

this group.

in the

dark studies could

In an attempt to control for the potential
of

conditioning infants' reaches for the sounding object and
as alluded to above, the object

was presented
object did not

to the infants in this

make

group

in silence

during the familiarization

trials; this

a sound until after infants had successfully
completed their reaches

and were manipulating the object themselves. As a
reaching, rather than preceding

it

result, the

and potentially acting

sound followed the

act of

as a conditioned stimulus.

Predictions

In the current study,

it

was reasoned

that regardless of their familiarity with the

doorbell sound, infants in the silent-object group should never have had the opportunity
to associate this

sound with a graspable

object.

On

the other hand, infants in the sound-

experience group were given the opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a
graspable object during the familiarization
hypothesis,

it

was expected

that

object during the familiarization

because of

trials.

According

to the representation

their experience in manipulating the

trials, infants in

the sound-experience group

sounding

would be

able to develop a representation of the graspable object associated with the doorbell

sound. Furthermore, this hypothesis suggests that these infants should rely on
representation to guide their reaching in the dark.

infants in the sound-experience group

to

them

in the

As

a result,

would reach toward

dark more often and on significantly more

object group.
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it

was predicted

the doorbell

trials

this

that

sound presented

than infants in the silent-

CHAPTER 2

METHOD
Subjects

A total of 46 infants were recruited from the state birth records of Massachusetts
with an explanatory

letter

followed by a telephone

call.

All infants were full term, had no

suspicion of hearing loss and were in good health on the day
of testing. Fourteen infants
(6 female, 8 male)

were eliminated, 10

(3

from the

silent-object group

and 7 from the

sound-experience group) due to fussiness/inability to complete the session,
3 (2 from the
silent-object group and

and
dark

1

1

from the sound-experience group) due

(from the silent-object group) because the parent spoke
trials.

Of the remaining 32

to the silent-object

to experimenter error,

to the infant during the

infants, half (6 male, 10 female)

were randomly assigned

group and half (10 male, 6 female) to the sound-experience group.

These infants ranged

in

age from 26 weeks, 4 days to 30 weeks, 4 days, with the mean

for the sound-experience group being 28 weeks, 2 days

for the silent-object group being 28 weeks, 5 days

(SD=6.82 days) and the mean age

(SD=7.18 days).

Apparatus

The apparatus was

a hard-plastic toy elephant (12 x 7.5 x 11

allowed for easy manipulation by

infants.

The sound-device

battery-operated doorbell system (Radio Shack

toy.

cat. no.

cm) whose trunk

portion of a wireless,

63-872) was implanted inside the

A tight screw-top cap attached to the top of the elephant prevented infants from

coming

into contact with the sound-device.

The

testing experimenter

was able

the sound-device while infants manipulated the toy using a remote control.
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to activate

Testing took place in a suite of rooms
consisting of an outer equipment room and

an inner, sound-deadened, testing room.
infants

was used

An

infrared video

to videotape their behavior in both the
Hght

scoring, the video signal

was passed through

an experimenter located

in the outer

the testing

room

camera suspended above the
and the dark. To aid

a date-time generator (For-A). In addition,

equipment room observed the events occurring

via a monitor connected to the infrared camera.

As

a result, s/he

able to inform the testing experimenter of the behavior of
infants during the dark
via a microphone connected to a set of headphones

This experimenter also timed each

when

trial

worn by

and communicated

onset of the dark

that

in

was
trials

the testing experimenter.

to the testing

experimenter

the appropriate time limits had been reached. Finally, the lights in the
testing

were controlled by a foot-pedal
at the

in

allowed the testing experimenter

to extinguish

room
them

trials.

Procedure

Each

infant

was seated

directly across

from the

testing experimenter

parent's lap at a comfortable reaching height and distance from a 31 x 91

throughout the entire session. Parents were instructed

to

on his/her

cm

table

hold their infants securely

at the

waist to allow for unrestricted arm movements. In order to prevent parents from
accidentally cueing their infants to orient and/or reach toward the sound presented to

them

in the dark,

parents wore a set of headphones during the testing session. The

headphones were connected
experimenter. Since

all

headphones through

this

the toy

(i.e.

to a small, clip-on

microphone worn by the

of the sounds in the room were presented

microphone, parents were unable

to

the source of the doorbell sound) during the dark
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in

testing

both ears of the

determine the location of

trials.

Once

seated, infants in both groups

The purpose of this time simply was

were allowed a

to ensure that

brief period of

in

time.

each infant was comfortable with both

the experimenter and the experimental situation
and to ensure that s/he

engage

warm-up

was

willing to

reaching behavior. During this time, the testing
experimenter repeatedly

presented each infant with a silent toy that was different
from the primary stimulus toy
(i.e.

a yellow sippy-cup toy that had a face painted on

it

or a yellow rubber duck). Both

the experimenter and the parent were allowed to talk to the
infant during this time in

order to encourage him/her to reach for and manipulate the toy. The
warm-up period

continued until the testing experimenter was satisfied that the infant was
comfortable and
willing to engage in reaching behavior.

Following the warm-up period, infants were presented with a
familiarization

These

trials.

trials

had two primary goals.

trials,

it

was

timed

First, since infants in

groups would be presented with a doorbell sound for 15 seconds

subsequent dark

series of

crucial to ensure that all infants

in the

both

dark during

would reach

for a toy

presented to them within this same time frame in the light without any verbal

encouragement from
trials

their parents and/or the experimenter. In addition to this, these

also provided infants in the sound-experience group only with an opportunity to

associate the doorbell sound with a specific, graspable toy.

During the familiarization
presented with the toy elephant

trials,

each infant

at his/her mid-line.

experimenter refrained from speaking

in the silent-object

group was

Both the parent and the

to the infant during this time,

testing

encouraging him/her

to reach for the toy only through the use of facial expressions (e.g. smiling, nodding, etc.)

when

necessary.

The

infant

was given a period of
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15 seconds from the time of

presentation to reach for and obtain the toy.
time, the experimenter in the outer

removed

room

If s/he failed to

reach for the toy during this

notified the testing experimenter,

the toy and proceeded with the next

trial.

If,

first

contact with

it.

then

on the other hand, the infant did

reach for the toy, s/he was allowed to manipulate and
explore

seconds from the time of his/her

who

it

for an additional 15

At the conclusion of the

1

5 seconds

of manipulation time, the experimenter in the outer equipment
room signaled the testing
experimenter. The testing experimenter then removed the toy and
after a brief
interval,

began the next

trial.

The

familiarization trials continued in this

infant successfully reached for and manipulated the toy

Like infants

in the silent-object group, infants in the

were presented with the same
trials.

total

manner

of four

removed and

toy.

sound-experience group also

silent toy elephant at mid-line during the familiarization

If the infant failed to

the next

trial

began.

and were manipulating the

triggered

by the

until the

trials.

Again, each infant was given 15 seconds from the time of presentation

and obtain the

for

on a

inter-trial

On

toy,

it

reach for the toy during this time,

to reach for

was

it

the other hand, once infants in this group reached

began

to

make

a doorbell sound. This sound was

testing experimenter via a remote control

and was produced by a sound-

device implanted in the toy. The toy continued to produce the doorbell sound as long as
the infant remained in contact with

it.

stopped triggering the sound-device

If the infant

released the toy, the experimenter

until the infant re-initiated contact with

infants in the silent-object group, each infant in this group

explore the toy for 15 seconds from the time of his/her

was allowed

first

it.

Like the

to manipulate

contact with the toy. Again,

the familiarization trials continued until the infant had successfully reached for and

manipulated the toy during four

trials.
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and

Following the familiarization

trials in

the light, infants in both the silent-object

and sound-experience groups were presented with eight
dark
trial,

trials.

At the onset of each

the testing experimenter centered the infant's
attention at mid-line and then

extinguished the lights by depressing a foot pedal. The
experimenter then placed the toy
at

60° to the infant's

from the

left

or right and within reaching distance

(i.e.

infant's mid-line) before triggering the doorbell sound.

15 seconds or until the infant reached out and contacted the toy,

was removed and
It is

and

left

and

cm

The sound continued
at

for

which time the toy

the lights were turned on.

important to note that the presentation of the toy
at

approximately 32

at

60° to the infant's right

a finger-tip's distance was an attempt to control for accidental contact with

the toy in the dark. In piloting,

resting at mid-line on the table.

line in the dark,

it

was possible

it

As

a result,

that s/he

toy as the experimenter presented

s/he might accidentally contact

was observed

it

it.

if

that infants often sat with their

the toy

if

would accidentally come

Furthermore,

s/he

was presented

were

if

presented

to turn or

hands

to the infant at

mid-

into contact with the

much

closer to the infant,

swing his/her arms. This

accidental contact might have signaled to the infant that there was a graspable object

producing the sound

toward

this

in the

dark and might have resulted

sound during subsequent

trials.

If this

were

in the infant reaching in the dark

to

happen

in the silent-object

group, then infants in this group would have the opportunity to associate the sound with a

graspable object, thereby defeating the purpose of

this

group

(i.e.

infants

the opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a graspable object).

the toy to the infant's right and

left

and

at

who had
By

presenting

a finger-tip's distance, the potential for
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not had

accidental contact

was decreased;

ideally, the infant

reach for the toy in order to grasp or touch

must have

initiated

an intentional

it.

In order to guide the testing experimenter
as to the placement of the toy in the

dark, clear plastic strips of contact paper were
placed on the table, demarcating two lines

extending from the infant's mid-line to the right and

from the

left

edges of the table

infant's mid-line. In the dark, the testing experimenter

was able

at

60° angles

to feel along

these strips with her fingertips to ensure the proper placement
of the toy. The placement

of the toy in the dark also was monitored by the second experimenter
located

equipment room. By communicating with the

in the outer

testing experimenter via headphones, this

experimenter ensured that the toy was placed within reach of the

infant.

A single sequence of dark trials was generated with the restriction that the toy be
presented to the right (R) during four of the

trials

number of trials. The sequence was reversed
result, half

of the infants

L-R-R-L-R-L-L-R

in

and to the

left

(L) during the remaining

for half of the infants in each group.

each group were presented with the sounding toy

As

a

in the order

(referred to as order 1) while the remaining infants were presented

with the sounding toy

in the

mirror image of this sequence, that

is,

R-L-L-R-L-R-R-L

(referred to as order 2).

Finally, in order to determine whether infants in both groups remained interested

in the task at

hand and were willing

session, the dark trials

to

engage

in

reaching behavior throughout the entire

were interspersed with four

light test trials similar to the

familiarization trials of each respective group. Unlike the

however, the toy was not removed

if

initial

the infant did not reach for

from the time of presentation. During these

trials,
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the toy

was

familiarization

it

trials,

within 15 seconds

available until the infant

reached for and obtained
light trials also served as

it.

For infants

light trials

received no more than two dark

The
infant

was

sound-experience group, these additional

reminders of the sounding toy. Once again,
a single random

sequence for the dark and

light (L) trials

in the

as follows:

was generated with

trials in

As

a row.

the restriction that infants

a result, the sequence of dark (D) and

D-D-L-D-L-D-D-L-D-L-D-D.

testing session continued as long as the infant did
not

began

to fuss or cry during the session, a short break

the testing session, the infant

was presented with one

the session the break had been taken.

The

was

become

taken.

fussy.

If

an

Upon resuming

light test trial regardless of

where

in

session then proceeded from the point of ihe

break until completion.

Scoring of Data

Videotapes of the testing sessions were coded by two independent observers. For
the familiarization and light test

trials,

observers recorded

trial

onset, whether there

was a

reach, the time of onset of the first reach for the toy, and the duration of each infant's

contact with the toy. Trial onset was defined as the frame

first

began

to release the toy

when

presenting

it

when

the testing experimenter

On

to the infant.

those occasions

infants reached for and contacted the toy as the testing experimenter presented

it

when
(i.e.

before the testing experimenter had the opportunity to release the toy), the starting time

of the

trial

determine

was recorded

how

as the

frame when the infant

long each infant spent

in

first

contacted the toy. In order to

contact with the toy

in the light,

recorded the frames during which infants contacted and released the
contacted and released the toy on more than one occasion per
the frames of each release and re-initiation of contact.
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If,

trial,

toy.

observers

If

an infant

observers recorded

however, an infant released and

re-initiated contact with the toy within
2 seconds, the release

and

times were excluded. For each of these famiharization
and light

was done without sound so
For the dark
during each

trial,

observers coded

the onset time of the

in

first

hand and

in a

A

trial

first

trial.

For these

number of reaches made

trials, trial

onset was defined

heard the doorbell sound after the lights had been

reach was defined as a continuous motion of the arm, with an opened

forward direction,

that

extended over the edge of the

have been extension of the elbow and an increase
the forearm.

onset, the

which each reach terminated, and whether there was any

frame when the observer

extinguished.

measures, scoring

reach, whether each reach ended in contact

accidental contact with the toy during each
as the

trial

as to keep observers blind to the condition
of each infant.

test trials,

with the toy, the sector

re-initiation of contact

Because

the light and dark

infants often

trials,

became

in the

table.

There must

angle between the shoulder and

interested in simply patting the table during

a definition for patting also

was devised

to aid observers in

distinguishing reaches from instances of patting. Patting was defined as a continuous

motion of the arm(s)

in a

forward direction that extended over the edge of the table but

was followed by immediate, repeated up and down movements of the arm(s)
place. Clear instances of patting

In order to

were not coded

code the sector

in

in the

same

as reaches.

which each reach terminated, a

clear template

was

created that could be placed on the monitor screen. This template marked the reaching

space of the infant on the table as a 180° semi-circle, with the mid-line of the table
serving as the 90° mark. This semi-circle was divided further into 6 sectors of 30° each,

with each sector being numbered. The termination of a reach was defined as the moment

in

which the

infant's

hand stopped moving forward or reversed
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direction.

Lastly, a

definition for accidental contact

other

was devised

movement of the arm and hand ended

accidental contact

the back of the

was determined

hand (not including

to

for determining

whether a reach or any

contact with the toy accidentally.

in

An

be any contact with the toy with a closed hand or

the fingers).

Finally, in order to determine whether the doorbell
sound
infants, observers recorded the direction of infants' very first

was

localized easily by

head turns and the amount

of time they spent oriented toward the direction of the sounding toy during
each dark
trial.

do

In order to

just described

mark and

this,

the mid-line

was used. The

either toward or

mark of the

table as demarcated

direction of the first head turn

away from

by the template

away from

this mid-line

the toy once the doorbell sound had started

recorded as the direction of the infant's

first

head

turn.

In scoring the

test

was

amount of time

spent oriented toward the sounding toy, a stop-watch was used. Each time an infant

turned

away from mid-line and toward

the hemifield

where the sounding toy was

the observer began the stop-watch and any time the infant turned

away from

hemifield, turned backward toward his/her parent, or faced straight ahead

line) the

start

observer stopped the stop-watch.

of the

trial (i.e. if

lights), the trial

If

an infant was not centered

at

located,

the correct

(i.e. at

mid-

mid-line

at the

s/he turned his/her head as the experimenter extinguished the

was not scored with regard

to

head turn and orientation time only.

Inter-Observer Reliability

The
the

reliability

sum

between observers was computed

as the

number of agreements divided by

of the number of agreements and disagreements.

correlation coefficient

reaches per

trial;

was computed

In addition, the

for the time-based measures and the

Cohen's kappa coefficient was computed
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Pearson

number of

for the remaining measures.

Reliabilities for each

measure are summarized

familiarization, light test and dark

trials,

during the familiarization and light
familiarization, light and dark

Table

1

.

For the onset of the

the times of contact and release with the
toy

test trials,

trials,

in

and the onset of the

first

reach during the

observers were considered to be in agreement

difference between their recorded times

was

less than 0.25 seconds.

For the

of time spent oriented toward the direction of the sound during
the dark

were considered
less than

to

be

in

agreement

if

total

trials,

reached (N=15), whether a reach ended

in contact

to

the

amount

scorers

the difference between their recorded times

0.50 seconds. Disagreements between the two observers as

if

was

whether an infant

with the toy (N=l) and whether the

infant accidentally contacted the toy during the dark trials (N=4) were settled
by a third

naive observer. For

all

additional measures, the judgements of the

used.
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first

observer were

Table

'^^^^"'"^

Light

1.

Inter-Observer Reliability

Criterion for agreement

Reliability

trials

'^"al onset

± 0.25 seconds

(familiarization and light

Pearson

99

54%

qo

1

combined)

test trials

Time of contact with

toy

Time of release of toy

Dark

r

± 0.25 seconds

93.69%

Pearson

0.99

r

± 0.25 seconds

93.69%

Pearson

1.00

r

trials

Trial onset

±

0.25 seconds

Pearson

which at
one reach occurred

r

94.53%
1

.00

Trials during

yes/no

96.09%

least

Cohen's kappa

0.90

± 0.25 seconds

95.85%

Onset of
(light

first

reach

and dark

Number

trials

combined)

of reaches per

trial

Pearson

total

agreement

Pearson
Sector

in

which reach ended

r

r

total agreement
Cohen's kappa

1

.00

92.92%
0.89

95.43%
0.94

Contact with toy

yes/no

98.48%

(including

Cohen's kappa

0.95

all

Direction of

accidental contacts)

first

Amount of time

head turn

spent oriented

toward sound of toy

yes/no

95.70%

Cohen's Kappa

0.91

± 0.50 seconds

88.89%

Pearson

0.99

r
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
The

current study sought to examine whether
infants can learn to associate a

novel sound with a graspable object and then
object

when

it is

no longer

visible.

utilize this association to represent the

Participants

silent-object or a sound-experience group and

manually explore a toy
that the toy

in the light.

The

were randomly assigned

were given the opportunity

sole difference between these

produced a doorbell sound when infants

not the silent-object group, manipulated
infants in both groups

in the

Following

it.

to reach for

and

two groups was

sound-experience group, but

their respective light experiences,

were presented with the doorbell sound

time spent in contact with the toy

in the light, the

of the reaches that were produced

in the dark, the direction

being presented with the doorbell sound

to either a

The amount of

in the dark.

number, direction, success, and latency

in the dark,

of the

first

head turns upon

and the amount of time spent

oriented toward that sound were coded for each infant.

A summary of infants'
trials is

presented in Table

underwent 139

light trials

group underwent a

4

infants (3

total

from the

2.

behaviors during the familiarization, light

As

infant

who was

trials; all

and dark

this table indicates, infants in the silent-object

and 128 dark

of 141 light

while infants

trials,

trials

and 128 dark

silent-object group and

was 24.01 seconds from

trials.

sound-experience

During the

light test trials,

trial

each.

The mean

latency of

the presentation of the toy. Furthermore, one

in the silent-object, order

other infants reached during

in the

group

from the sound-experience group) took

1

longer than 15 seconds to reach for the toy on one light

these 4 reaches

test

1

group did not reach during any of the dark

at least

one dark
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trial.

Table

Measure
Light

2.

Summary

of Behavior

Silent-object group

Sound-experience group

trials

Number

of

trials

familiarization trials

68

trials

74

trials

light test trials

71

trials

67

trials

Number

of light

trials

during which

138

(97.87%)

trials

136

(96.45%)

trials

infants reached

Mean

latency to reach during:
familiarization trials

light test trials

Mean amount

of time spent

1

.35 seconds

1.46 seconds

(SD=1.25)

(SD=2.27)

1 .94 seconds
(SD=3.03)

(SD=2.91)

21.53 seconds

20.90 seconds

(SD=3.79)

(SD=2.23)

1.93 seconds

in

contact with the toy during:
familiarization trials

light test trials

Dark

19.76 seconds

(SD=2.93)

128

128

trials

Number

of

Number

of accidental contacts

Number

of dark

trials

trials

during which

infants reached

excluding

all trials

following

an accidental contact

How

19.06 seconds

(SD=4.01)

far into the session infants

produced

trials

trials

7 contacts

7 contacts

48

(37.50%)
(M=3.00, SD=2.13)

68

43

59

trials

trials

(33.59%)

(M=2.50, SD=1.79)
3.47

trial

(SD=2.53)

trials

(53.13%)

(M=4.25,SD=1.77)
trials

(46.09%)

(M=3.69,SD=1.96)
2.75

trial

(SD=1.88)

their first reaches

Continued, next page.
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Table

Number

of reaches during dark

trials

excluding reaches following
an accidental contact during
a given

all trials following
an accidental contact

of reaches per

trial

Direction of reaches

Reaches ending

in contact

92 reaches

14 reaches

1

(M=5.75, SD=4.88)

(M=7.13,SD=4.11)

88 reaches

106 reaches

(M=5.50, SD=4.58)

(M=6.63, SD=3.30)

75 reaches

87 reaches

(M=4.69,SD=4.11)

(M=5.44, SD=3.50)

.65 reaches

(SD=0.55)

1

.67 reaches

(SD=0.67)

51 to the

left (55.43%)
(M=3.73, SD=2.76)

58

to the left

41 to the right (44.57%)

56

to the right

(M=2.40, SD=3.09)

(M=3.50,SD=3.01)

1 1

proportion of reaches

Reaches terminated

1

(50.88%)
(M=3.63, SD=2.66)
(49.13%)

with the toy

number of trials
number of reaches

mean

continued

trial

excluding

Mean number

2,

trials

(22.92%)

16

trials

(23.53%)

12 reaches (13.04%)

19 reaches (16.67%)

0.19(SD=0.28)

0.14(SD=0.18)

34 trials (70.83%)
47 reaches (51.09%)
0.65 (SD=0.28)
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37

51

in the correct

sectors

number of trials
number of reaches
mean proportion of reaches
Reaches terminated

(61.76%)
54 reaches (47.37%)
0.52 (SD=0.26)
trials

in the correct

hemifield

number of trials
number of reaches
mean proportion of reaches

Mean

Dark
first

latency to reach

trials

(77.08%)

51 reaches (55.43%)

trials (75.00%)
67 reaches (58.77%)

0.68 (SD=0.24)

0.61 (SD=0.24)

6.88 seconds

7.40 seconds

(SD=3.24)

(SD=3.38)

trials

during which infants

head turn was toward the toy
92

number of trials

Mean

proportion of

Mean amount

of time spent

trials

oriented toward the sounding toy

during dark

trials

(81.42%)

82

trials

(71.30%)

0.81 (SD=0.13)

0.72 (SD=0.15)

7.38 seconds

7.14 seconds

(SD=1.45)

(SD=1.70)

trials
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A Group (silent-object versus sound-experience)
X Trial type (familiarization versus light

test trials)

mean

Measure

Mean amount

3.

Table

ANOVAs

Source
or time

in contact

versus order 2)

(ANOVA) was

with the toy during the

latency to reach for the toy during these

results of these analyses are presented in

Table

1

Analysis of Variance

conducted on the mean amount of time infants spent
light trials as well as their

x Order (order

trials.

The

3.

for Light Trials

df

F

spent in contact with

Between subjects
Group (G)

1

0.002

0.97

the toy

Order (0)

1

1.28

0.27

GxO

1

0.39

0.54

Error

28

(12.75)

Within subjects
Trial type (T)

Mean

latency to reach

for the toy

1

5.37

0.03

1

0.74

0.40

1

0.27

0.61

TxGXO

1

0.83

0.37

Error

28

(9.68)

TxG
TxO

Between Subjects
Group (G)

1

0.01

0.94

Order (0)

1

0.31

0.58

GxO

1

0.0002

0.99

Error

28

(8.65)

Within Subjects
Trial type (T)

1

1.16

0.29

TxG
TxO

1

0.02

0.90

1

1.21

0.28

1

1.97

0.17

28

(3.86)

TxGXO
Error

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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As Table
to the

3 indicates, there

amount of time spent

was a

not surprising since the light test

trials

e=0.03. Infants spent

light test trials respectively.

occurred later

familiarization trials and thus can be explained

More

effect of trial type with regard

in contact with the toy during
the familiarization

and 19.41 seconds (SD=3.47) during the

the toy.

main

in contact with the toy, F(l,28)=5.37,

an average of 21.21 seconds (SD=3.08)
trials

significant

by

This effect

is

in the testing session than the

fatigue and/or eventual

boredom with

importantly, however, infants in both groups spent
similar amounts of time

contacting and manipulating the toy and they had similar
latencies to reach for the toy

during the light

trials.

In order to

examine

infants' reaching behavior during the dark trials,
each infant

was assigned a score ranging from 0

to 8 that represented the

which s/he made

In addition to this measure, the

reach, the total

computed

at least

one reach.

number of reaches made, and

the

for each infant. Finally, each infant

that represented the dark trial during

was assigned

was excluded from

1

group

1

versus order 2)

first

the session each infant produced his/her

first

mean

The one

latency to reach and

reach in the dark.
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1

to 8

reach,

A Group (silent-

infant

did not produce any reaches during the dark

the analyses examining the

were

also

ANOVA was conducted

the results are presented in Table 4.

who

trial

a score ranging from

in the session.

during

trials

latency to

which the infant produced his/her very

object versus sound-experience) x Order (order

the silent-object, order

mean

number of reaches per

with low numbers indicating reaches occurring early

on each of these measures and

number of dark

how

from

trials

far into

Table

4.

Measure

Mean

Source

latency to reach

Number
infants

of

trials

produced

when

df

F

E

Group (G)

1

0.22

Order (0)

1

GxO

0.86

0.36

1

0.004

0.95

Error

21

(11.40)

Group (G)

at least

one reach

Number

ANOVAs for Reaches During Dark Trials

1

3.05

0 09

Order (0)

1

0.03

GxO

0.86

1

0.03

0.86

Error

28

(4.09)

when

Group (G)

1

6.25

0.02

at least

Order (0)

1

0.13

GxO

0.72

one reach (excluding

1

0.56

0.46

outlier)

Error

27

(3.19)

infants

of

Number
infants

trials

produced

of

trials

produced

when

Group (G)

1

3.13

0.09

at least

Order (0)

1

1.05

0.31

GxO

1

0.22

0.65

Error

28

(3.60)

one reach (excluding
trials

all

following an

aCClUClUal LUIlldClj

Number

Number

of reaches

of reaches

excluding

all

reaches

following an accidental
coniaci

aunng

Number

d given

iridi

of reaches

excluding

all trials

following an accidental

Number
per

trial

of reaches

Group (G)

1

0.72

0.40

Order (0)

1

0.29

0.59

GxO

1

0.72

0.40

Error

2o

(21.05)

Group (G)

1

0.61

0.44

Order (0)

1

0.07

0.80

GxO

1

0.92

0.35

Group (G)

1

0.31

0.58

Order (0)

1

0.85

0.36

GxO

1

1.03

0.32

Error

28

(14.63)

Group (G)

1

0.02

0.90

Order (0)

1

0.45

0.51

GxO

1

3.28

0.08

Error

28

(0.35)

Error

Continued, next page.
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Table

How

far into session

infants
first

produced

their

continued

4,

Group (G)

0.85

0.37

Order (O)

0.21

0.65

0.59

0.45

GxO

reach

Error

27

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent

Although infants

in the

in the

was not

mean square

errors.

sound-experience group did reach on more

infants in the silent-object group (M=4.25,

difference

(5.14)

trials

SD=1.77 versus M=3.69, SD=1.96),

significant (see Table 4).

Upon

than

this

closer examination of these data and

course of performing the above analyses, however, the

SYSTAT

8.0 statistical

software package used to analyze the data detected an outlier; while scores for the infants
in

both the silent-object and sound-experience groups generally ranged from 0

there

was one

who

infant in the silent-object group

had a score of 8

trials.

When

this outlier

reached on every dark

was eliminated,

the

31.25% of the dark

trials)

and the difference between the

sound-experience group on

While
during more

there

trials

was

this

measure was

trials

silent-object

of

6

trials

(SD=1.72)

(i.e.

group and the

significant, F(l,27)=6.25, p=0.02.

a tendency for infants in the sound-experience group to reach

than infants in the silent-object group,

that during several trials, 8 infants (5

from the

it is

silent-object

important to keep in mind

and 3 from the sound-

experience group) accidentally contacted the toy. These accidental contacts

may have

signaled to these infants that there was a graspable object available during the dark

Because of

this, all

eliminated and the

reaches following an accidental contact during a given

total

trials,

and thus

trial

mean number

during which infants in the silent-object group reached was 2.67

to

number of reaches produced by each
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trial

trials.

were

infant during the dark trials

was recalculated

(see Table 2). Furthermore, since

of accidentally contacting an object
trials, all trials

following a

in the

dark

it

is

possible that infants' memories

may have

carried over to subsequent

during which an accidental contact occurred
were

trial

excluded and an additional measure of the number of dark
reached, as well as the total

Group

(silent-object versus sound-experience) x Order (order

Table

4.

While

regard to these

in the

during which infants

number of reaches made, was obtained

was conducted on each of these
in

trials

three

new measures and

1

(see Table 2).

versus order 2)

new measures

these results also are presented

also

were not

significant.

silent-object

and sound-experience groups

with regard to the total number of reaches, the number of reaches per
into the testing session each infant

it is

very

first

in the

sound-experience group

reach in the dark earlier

group (see Table

first

trial

and how

far

reach in the dark were not

in the

made more

expected direction

examine

reaches and produced their

in the testing session than infants in the silent-object

the success of infants' reaches during the dark test

number of trials during which

at least

number of trials during which

one reach resulted

at least

surrounding the toy and the number of
the correct hemifield,

was

trials

in contact

trials,

in the

two

the

with the toy, as well

two

one reach terminated

in the

during which

one reach terminated

at least

sectors

calculated for each infant. In addition, the proportion of

reaches that resulted in contact with the toy, as well as the proportion of reaches that

terminated

in

2).

In order to

as the

produced his/her

important to note that these differences were

every case. Infants

ANOVA

expected direction, the differences between the two groups with

Although the differences between the

significant,

A

sectors surrounding the toy and the proportion of reaches that
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in

terminated in correct hemifield, was calculated
for each infant. As previously
mentioned,
a template was created that divided infants' reaching
space into a 180° semi-circle. This
semi-circle

was

further divided into 6, 30° sectors, with
the infants' mid-line serving as

the 90° mark. Since the toy

from the

furthest

it.

directly

on the

between the 2 sectors

line

center, reaches that terminated in either of these

considered to be successful
contacting

was presented

in so far as

Combined, the

with the toy occupying 7.5

they

arc of these

cm

came

two

two

sectors

were

close to the toy without actually

sectors

measured approximately 16.76 cm,

of that space.

A Group (silent-object versus sound-experience) x Order (order

1

versus order 2)

ANOVA was conducted on each of the above measures of success and the results are
presented in Table
reach at

all

5.

The one

during the dark

infant

trials

from the

silent object, order

was excluded from each of these

1

group

who

analyses.

did not

While

the

differences between the silent-object and sound-experience groups were in the expected
direction, with infants in the sound-experience group reaching into the correct sectors and

hemifield and contacting the toy more often than infants

Table

2), these differences

In addition to the

and

to the right also

were not

experience) X Order (order

1

total

number of reaches

for each infant.

(left

during the dark

trials.

As

versus right)

results also are presented in Table 5.

analysis excludes the one infant from the silent-object, order

all

directed to the

A Group (silent-object versus

versus order 2) x Direction

conducted on these data and these

group (see

significant (see Table 5).

above measures, the

was computed

in the silent-object

table 5 indicates, there

group

sound-

ANOVA was

Once

who

were no significant

interactions with regard to the direction of infants' reaches.
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1

left

again, this

did not reach

effects or

at

Table

5.

ANOVAs for Success in Reaching During Dark Trials

Test

Source

Number

of

with

df

E

Group (G)

1

0.39

0.54

Order (0)

1

0.36

resulting in contact with

GxO

0.87

1

0.10

0.76

the toy

Error

27

n

at least

trials

one reach

Number

of

with

25^

Group (G)

1

0.41

0.53

Order (0)

1

1.11

GxO

0.30

terminating in the

1

0.32

0.57

correct sectors

Error

27

(2 01)

Group (G)

1

1.47

0.24

Order (0)

1

0.52

GxO

0.48

terminating in the

1

0.01

0.94

correct hemifield

Error

27

(2.62)

Proportion of reaches

Group (G)

1

0.31

0.58

resulting in contact

Order (0)

1

0.04

0.85

with the toy

GxO

1

1.06

0.31

Error

27

(0.06)

Proportion of reaches

Group (G)

1

1.93

0.18

terminating in the correct

Order (0)

1

0.13

0.72

sectors

GxO

1

1.79

0.19

Error

27

fO 07)

Proportion of reaches

Group (G)

1

0.69

0.42

terminating in the correct

Order (0)

1

0.52

0.48

hemifield

GxO

1

1.99

0.17

Error

27

(0.05)

Group (G)

1

0.36

0.55

Order (0)

1

0.60

0.44

GxO

1

0.36

0.55

Error

27

(10.28)

at least

Number
at least

trials

one reach

of

trials

with

one reach

Direction of reaches

Within Subjects
1

Direction (D)

1

DxG
DxO
Dx. GxO
Error

Note. Values enclosed

in

parentheses represent
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1

HQ

1

0.74

0.40

1

0.65

0.43

1

0.44

0.80

27

(6.78)

mean square

errors.

Finally, in order to determine whether
infants were able to localize the doorbell

sound during the dark

trials,

the proportion of trials during which infants'

were away from mid-line and toward the doorbell sound
was computed

The mean proportion was 0.77 (SD=0.15), which was
(i.e.

infant spent oriented toward the sounding toy

versus sound-experience) x Order (order

1

significant

main

mean amount

was computed.

versus order 2)

these data and the results are presented in Table

6.

for each infant.

significantly different

0.50), t(31)=10.10, p<0.001. In addition to this, the

As

head turns

first

from chance

of time each

A Group (silent-object

ANOVA was conducted on

this table indicates, there

were no

effects or interactions with regard to either of these measures.

Table

Test

ANOVAs

6.

for

Head

Source

Orientation During Dark Trials

F

df

E

during

Group (G)

1

3.17

0.09

Which first head turn was
Toward the sounding toy

Order (0)

1

0.18

0.68

GxO

1

2.47

0.13

Error

28

(0.02)

Proportion of

Mean amount

trials

Group (G)

1

0.18

0.68

Oriented toward the

Order (0)

1

0.33

0.57

Sounding toy

GxO

1

1.30

0.26

Error

28

(2.53)

of time spent

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent
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mean square

errors.

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
As mentioned,
of representations

the primary purpose of the current study

in infants'

Recent studies examining

this

matter have found that

when given

light,

the opportunity to

some

1991; McCall

al.,

& Clifton,

1998,

(e.g. Perris

etc.).

&

Based on

researchers have concluded that infants as young as 6 Vi months can

form associations between objects and sounds. More importantly, they conclude
infants rely

first

6 V2 month old infants will reach

high rates toward these same sounding objects in the dark

Clifton, 1988; Clifton, Rochat, et

these results,

to mvestigate the role

reaching in the dark toward unseen, sounding
objects.

reach for and manipulate sounding objects in the
at consistently

was

on these representations

to guide their reaching behavior in the dark

that

when

these objects can only be heard, but not seen (Clifton, 1998).

Because they challenge the Piagetian claim
unseen objects

until they

that infants are not able to represent

have achieved object permanence

conclusions drawn from the reaching

in the

challenge to the conclusions drawn from

at

8-10 months of age, the

dark literature have been scrutinized. One

this line

of research comes from studies

suggesting that infants will reach for sounds that they have not had the opportunity to

associate with graspable objects (Stack et

Equally problematic

is

al,

1989; Clifton, Perris,

& McCall,

1999).

the suggestion that by allowing infants to reach for sounding

objects in the light, researchers have classically conditioned them to reach toward these

sounds

in the

two points

dark (Clifton, Rochat,

et al., 1991; Clifton, 1998).

call into question the conclusions

literature regarding

young

drawn from

infants' abilities to
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form and

Taken

together, these

the reaching in the dark

utilize representations.

The
form and

current study sought to examine
the question of whether young
infants can

utilize representations to guide
their behavior

problems just described. Infants were divided

into

by controlHng for the two

two groups, a

silent-object

and a

sound-experience group, and were allowed to
reach for a toy during several
familiarization trials in the light. For infants
in the silent-object group, the
toy remained

completely

silent

during these

trials,

while for infants

in the

sound-experience group, the

toy began to produce a doorbell sound only after
these infants had reached for and

obtained the toy. Following their respective light
experiences, infants

were presented with the doorbell sound

in the

in

both groups

dark and their reaching behavior was

observed.

Reaching for Sounds

As just mentioned, one

challenge posed to the reaching

in the

dark literature

involves several studies demonstrating infants' willingness to reach for sounds

in the

dark which they have not had the opportunity to associate with graspable objects.
studies

by Stack

reached toward

et al.

rattle

(1989) and Clifton, Ferris,

sounds

produced these sounds
in these studies

in the

& McCall

In

two

(1999), infants consistently

dark without ever being shown the objects that

in the laboratory.

In other words,

it

initially

appeared as

if

infants

reached without any supposed "knowledge" of whether the source of

those sounds were graspable objects. Such behavior opened the door to the possibility

that in the traditional reaching in the dark studies (e.g. Ferris

Rochat, et

al.,

1991; Clifton, Ferris,

& Bullinger

infants also reached for the sounds presented to

1991; Litovsky

1988; Clifton,

& Clifton,

1992;

etc.),

them without any "knowledge", or

representation, of the objects producing those sounds.
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& Clifton,

While the

results of the studies

McCall (1999) suggested

by Stack

that infants will reach

et al.

(1989) and Clifton, Perris,

toward sounds

in the

&

dark regardless of

whether they have formed representations of the objects
producing those sounds, the
current study sought to investigate a second, equally
plausible explanation referred to as

the representation hypothesis.

Perris,

& McCall

As pointed out

previously. Stack et

(1999) presented infants with

suggested here that since

rattles are fairly

rattle

sounds

common baby

al.

(1989) and Clifton,

in the dark.

It

toys in our society,

has been

it is

more

than likely that most of the infants in these two studies had experience
playing with
rattles prior to entering the laboratory.

hypothesized that infants

in the

Based on

Stack et

al.

this line of reasoning,

and Clifton,

Perris,

it

was

and McCall studies came

into the laboratory with a well-developed association between the rattle sounds
and
rattles

themselves as graspable objects. Consequently, rather than just reaching for the

sounds, the infants in these studies

may have been

reaching for a "graspable object"

a rattle) based on these previously developed representations of

rattles

(i.e.

and the sounds

that they produce.

In order to investigate the hypothesis that infants will reach toward sounds in the

dark only

when

they have had the opportunity to develop an association between those

sounds and particular objects, infants
electronic doorbell sound in the dark.

in the current study

It

was reasoned

were presented with an

that infants never

would have had

the opportunity to associate this sound with a graspable object prior to entering the

laboratory.

While

infants in the sound-experience group were given the opportunity to

associate this sound with a particular toy in the light, infants in the silent-object group

were presented with

this

sound only

in the dark.
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Infants in the silent-object group.

therefore, should have

(i.e.

whether

had no knowledge, or representation, of the source
of

came from

it

Because

were not given the opportunity

develop a representation of the toy associated with the doorbell
sound,
that they should reach very

little

toward

this

study support this line of reasoning. Infants

trials,

well below the

70-80%

sounds (Perris

& Clifton,

1991; Litovsky

It is

sound

in the dark.

in the silent-object

The

it

to

was predicted

results of the current

group reached on only

a reaching rate in line with that obtained during piloting and

rate obtained in previous reaching in the dark studies using
rattle

& Clifton,

1988; Clifton, Rochat, et

1992;

al.,

& BuUinger

1991; Clifton, Perris,

etc.).

interesting to note that in the current study, the rate of reaching for infants in

the silent-object group

As mentioned

was similar

to that obtained

by Clifton,

Perris,

previously, infants in that study reached on only 3

1

& Bullinger (1991).

% of the dark trials

during which they were presented with novel, computer-generated "pips"

was suggested
in the light to

result,

sound

a graspable object).

infants in the silent-object group

37.50% of the dark

this

when

earlier that infants in that study

in the dark.

It

were not provided with enough experience

develop a representation of the object associated with those sounds. As a

infants heard those unusual sounds in the dark, they

may have

reached

infrequently simply because they had no representation of the type of object

graspable or not graspable) producing those sounds. The fact that infants

(i.e.

in the silent-

object group of the current study also reached infrequently in the dark supports this

hypothesis.

Taken

together, these

two

studies suggest that infants

who have

not had the

opportunity to develop a well-formed association between a novel sound and a graspable
object will not reach frequently for that sound in the dark.
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In addition to the

low

rate of reaching predicted for infants
in the silent-object

group, the representation hypothesis also predicted
that infants

who were

opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a
graspable object

sound-experience group) would reach

knowledge regarding

in the

(i.e.

infants in the

dark more often than infants

the source of this sound

(i.e.

given the

who had no

infants in the silent-object group).

The

results of the current study marginally support this
hypothesis: infants in the sound-

experience group reached during significantly more of the dark
silent-object group

when one

outlier

was eliminated. Furthermore,

silent-object group, infants' very first head turns

dark were toward that sound on 81

was not due

trials

upon hearing

than infants in the

the fact that in the

the doorbell sound in the

% of the trials suggests that their low rate of reaching

to an inability to localize this sound.

Taken together with

the

low frequency

rate of reaching in the silent-object group, this result supports the suggestion that the

opportunity to develop an association between a graspable object and

its

sound plays an

important role in infants' willingness to reach when presented with that sound

in the

dark.

Additional Comparisons to Previous Studies

While

infants in the sound-experience group did reach during

it

infants in the sound-experience group

(i.e.

1988; Clifton, Rochat, et

1992;

etc.).

One

al.,

trials

should be noted that the rate of reaching for

than infants in the silent object group,

in previous reaching in the dark studies

more dark

53.13%) was below the 70-80%

employing the

1991; Clifton, Perris,

rattle

sound

& Bullinger

possible explanation for this difference

may

rate obtained

(e.g. Perris

1991; Litovsky

& Clifton,
& Clifton,

be the positioning of the

toy in the dark. While within reaching distance, the sounding toy in the current study
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was presented
(i.e.

15

cm)

mentioned,

at

a greater distance from the infants

(e.g. Clifton, Perris,

this

in the dark.

was done

Perhaps

& Bullinger,

in order to

this distance

1991; Litovsky

previous studies

in

& Clifton,

1992,

was a

bit too far for infants to detect that
the

As

studies by Clifton, Perris,

sounding

& Bullinger

& Clifton (1992) have found, infants will not reach for sounding

objects that are placed

beyond reaching

distance.

It is

important to note, however, that

these studies, "beyond reaching distance" was defined as 60 and 100

a far greater distance than the 32

cm

used

in the current study.

As

cm

from the

beyond reaching distance seems

a result, while

more

was placed too

far

from the

in the

be

infants in the

dark studies

infants' relative experiences with the sounds used in these studies.

here that infants frequently reach toward

rattles at

to

plausible explanation for the difference in reaching

frequency between the current study and previous reaching

experience with

it

unlikely.

the possibility that the toy

current study, a second

in

infant,

possible, the suggestion that infants did not reach for the toy because they judged

Beyond

As

etc.).

prevent infants from accidentally contactmg
the toy

toy actually was within reaching distance.

(1991) and Litovsky

32 cm) than

(i.e.

rattle

sounds

home. Undoubtedly,

infants

explore and develop an association between

rattles

in the

It

lies in

has been suggested

dark based on their prior

have had much more time

and

their

sounds

at

home

to

than the few

short minutes that infants in the sound-experience group had to explore the novel,

doorbell sounding toy in the current study.

amount of time spent exploring

rattle

possible that this difference in the

these sounding toys

representations formed, which in turn

dark for the

It is

may have

linked to the strength of the

affected the frequency of reaching in the

and doorbell sounds respectively.
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is

Beyond
differ

from the

the lower frequency rate of reaching,
the results of the current study also
traditional reaching in the dark studies
with regard to the

reaches that ended close to or in contact with the
toy
the dark studies,

60-92% of

& Clifton,

the target object (Perris

& McCall,

1998; Clifton, Perris,

came

infants' reaches

toy)

infants' reaches

close to the toy

and only 16.67% ended

have come close

1988; Litovsky

1999;

etc.),

(i.e.

in contact

in the dark.

while

& Perris,

to the smaller objects

used

to or

ended

in contact with

1992; Goubet

& Clifton,

only 47.37% of

terminated in the two sectors surrounding the

with

in

In previous reaching in

in the current study,

it.

This low success rate

surprising given the large size of the toy used in this study

compared

number of

previous studies

especially

12 x 7.5 x

(i.e.

(e.g.

is

cm)

1 1

4 x 4 x 8 cm)

(Perris

&

Clifton, 1988). If infants in the sound-experience group of the current study
were relying

on

their representations of the

reaches should have

come

sounding toy to guide

their reaching in the dark, then their

close to and/or ended in contact with the toy as often as the

those of infants in previous reaching in the dark studies.

As was

the case in explaining their lower reaching rate,

lower success rate of

infants' reaches in the sound-experience

it is

possible that the

group of the current study

versus those of infants in previous reaching in the dark studies was due to the distance of

the toy

had

from the

to lean

forward slightly with

during the dark

therefore

A

infants. In addition to extending their arms, infants in the current study

trials.

their torsos in order to successfully contact the toy

Presenting the toy

may have prevented them from
second factor

that

localizability of the sound.

at a finger tip's

contacting

it

distance from the infants

with their deliberate reaches.

may have

affected infants' success rates

While the

fact that infants oriented
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was

the

toward the doorbell sound

with their

head turns on 70-80% of the dark

first

trials

localizing the approximate direction of this sound

suggests that they had Httle trouble

(i.e.

to their right or left), pin-pointing

the exact location of the source of the doorbell sound
in order to contact

more

difficult than pin-pointing the source of the
rattle

sounds

in

may have been

may have been

previous studies.

Difficulty in determining the exact location of the sounding
toy beyond

therefore

it

left

and right

an additional factor contributing to the surprisingly
low success

rate of infants' reaches in the current study.

The Table
In piloting the current study,

its

it

was observed

that the

combination of the toy and

implanted sound device was slightly too heavy for infants

and explore

it

in mid-air

without any support. As a

to

comfortably manipulate

result, infants in this study

were

seated on their parents' laps at a comfortable reaching height and distance from a wooden
table.

In both the light

and the dark, the toy was presented

to infants

on

this table.

Once

they had reached for and obtained the toy, the table provided the additional support that
infants

needed
It is

in

order to manipulate and explore the toy easily.

important to note that the use of a table was a departure from the method of

toy presentation used in previous reaching in the dark studies

1988; Clifton, Rochat, et

1992; McCall

& Clifton,

studies, the toys

enough

al.,

1991; Clifton, Perris,

always were presented

that infants could manipulate

method of presentation may explain

at the

& Bullinger

& McCall,

1998; Clifton, Perris

(e.g. Perris

end of a rod

them without any

1999;

& Clifton,

1991; Litovsky

etc.).

in mid-air

& Clifton,

In each of these

and were

support. In short, this

light

new

several of the differences uncovered between the

current study and previous reaching in the dark studies, as well as the lack of significant
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differences between the silent-object and
sound-experience groups with regard to several

measures of their reaching behavior.
In addition to providing infants with the extra
support necessary for

manipulate and explore the toy, the table
distraction.

During the

itself

them

to

served as an unforeseeable source of

light trials, infants often

played with the toy by banging

it

against

the table-top. Furthermore, in both the light and the dark, infants
often tactually explored
the surface of the table by sliding their hands across

it.

This was especially true during the dark

little

else

beyond

trials,

when

infants

had nothing

to look at

and

the doorbell sound to capture their attention. Because patting,
tapping

and sliding one's hands on a
reaching behavior

(i.e.

table often involve actions

trials

which look

identical to general

extension of the arm(s) in a forward motion, an increase

angle between the shoulder and the forearm,

during the dark

surface and/or patting and tapping

its

etc.),

in the

the frequency of these behaviors

severely complicated the scoring of infants' reaches. While

detailed definitions and criteria were created in an attempt to distinguish infants' interest

in

and exploration of the

the current study

infants

simply

(i.e.

table

from deliberate reaches

was extremely conservative so

for the toy, scoring of the data in

as not to infer the intentions of the

to reach for the toy or to explore the table).

may have been

As

a result,

many

actions that

the result of infants' exploration of the table were in fact coded as

reaches.

Since infants' table-directed behaviors often were scored as reaches, the number

of

trials

during which infants reached, as well as their

likely overestimated

sounding toy

by observers. As a

in the current study

may

result, the

total

number of reaches, was most-

frequency of reaching for the

actually be lower for both the silent-object and
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sound-experience groups than that reported here. This
result of scoring

in contact

may be one reason why the

inflation in the reaching rate as a

percentage of reaches that ended close to or

with the toy in the current study was so low
when compared to previous

reaching in the dark studies. As pointed out, since the
toy used

in the current study

larger than the toys used in previous studies, one

infants to be more, not

less, successful in

obtaining the toy

when reaching

number of the reported reaches were
table

come

and not the

toy, then

may be

the goal of their

for

it.

If,

however, a substantial

actually exploratory actions directed toward the

one would not expect as many of these actions/reaches

close to or contact the toy.

therefore

would expect

The low success

explained by infants' interest

manual exploration and action

in the table.

trial,

to the total

while

The

table

may have become

rather than the toy.

reaches, the use of a table in the current study also

between these two groups with regard

to

rate of infants' reaches in both groups

In addition to providing an explanation for the

and the number of reaches per

was

in the

low success

may

explain

rate of infants'

why

the differences

number of reaches produced by

infants

expected direction, did not reach

significance. If infants in the sound-experience group developed an association between

the doorbell sound and the toy based on their experience with

it

in the light,

then these

infants should have used this information, or representations, to guide their reaching

behavior in the dark. Consequently, one would expect that when infants

reached out and failed to contact the toy, they should have continued
for

it

until they contacted

group,

who

it.

At the same time, however,

in this

to reach

group

and search

infants in the silent-object

did not have the opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a graspable

object, should

have had no "knowledge"

that the source of this
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sound was a graspable

object.

If infants'

reaching in the dark toward sounding
objects truly

guided by their

is

representations of the sources of those sounds,
infants in the silent-object group
should

have had no reason

when

to believe that a graspable object
existed in the dark.

infants in this group reached out and failed to
contact the toy

sound), they should have had no reason to continue searching
for

According

to the

above

that

ended

is

in contact

very successful

a result,

the source of the

(i.e.

it.

line of reasoning, infants in the sound-experience

should have produced significantly more reaches
object group. This

As

in the

dark than those

group

in the silent-

especially true considering the extremely low percentage
of reaches

with the toy for infants in both groups. Obviously, infants were
not

in contacting the toy, therefore,

one would have expected

infants in the

sound-experience, but not the silent-object group, to continually search and reach for the

sounding object
object group.

in the dark,

As

thereby producing more reaches than infants in the

the results of the current study indicate, this

the sound-experience group did not produce significantly

was not

silent-

the case; infants in

more reaches

in the

dark than

infants in the silent-object group.

As

why

previously mentioned, the use of the table in the current study

infants in the sound-experience group did not produce significantly

than those in the silent-object group.

When

infants,

it

is,

the table.

may have been

case for the infants

While the

table

in the silent-object

the type of object that

was producing

may

engage

sufficient to

explain

more reaches

infants in both the sound-experience and

silent-object groups reached in the dark, they consistently

object, that

may

group,

came

into contact with an

not have been the "target object", for the

their interest. This especially

who

would be

should have had no "knowledge" of

the doorbell sound, and therefore, the type of
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the

object, if any, that they should have contacted.
But

experience group?

If

what about the

they truly "knew" that the doorbell
sound was produced by a

graspable object and reached out expecting to contact
table,

which was not graspable/obtainable

satisfied their expectations. Infants in this

toy

(i.e.

infants in the sound-

in the

this object, then contacting the

same manner

as the toy, should not

group should have continued

the expected graspable object) and therefore

still

have

to search for the

should have produced more

reaches than infants in silent-object group.

Why didn't infants
in the

this

dark than infants

in the

sound-experience group reach significantly more often

in the silent-object

group contacted the

group? One possibility

table, the table itself distracted

them from

is

that

their

when

infants in

primary goal of

reaching for and obtaining the sounding toy.

Upon

found exploring

interesting than searching for the toy.

this surface equally or

more

Infants in the sound-experience group thus

contacting the table, infants

may have

failed to continue searching

reaching for the sounding toy not because they did not
existed, but rather, simply because they

More

importantly, this

may

be

why

know

were distracted by

and

that a graspable object

their contact with the table.

the difference between the sound-experience and

silent-object groups with regard to the total

the average

may have

number of reaches produced per

number of reaches produced per

trial,

session and

while in the expected directions, did

not reach significance.

Conditioning

While
significantly

infants in the sound-experience group of the current study did not produce

more

reaches, these infants did reach during significantly

more dark

trials

than the infants in the silent-object group. This result supports the argument that infants
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reach for sounding objects in the dark based on their representations
of those objects.

More

importantly, however, by presenting infants in the sound-experience
group with the

doorbell sound only after their reaches for the toy were completed,
the design of the
current study eliminated the possibility that their reaches simply were
the result of
classical,

forward conditioning.

While eliminating
reaches, one might

the potential for the classical, forward conditioning of infants'

wonder whether

conditioning to occur.

may be

It

the current design created the potential for backward

argued that presenting infants

group with the doorbell sound following the completion of
the stage for the occurrence of

backward conditioning.

experience group of the current study

may have

in the

sound-experience

their reaches for the toy set

If correct, infants in the

sound-

reached during more of the dark

trials

than infants in the silent-object group because they were conditioned to do so during the
familiarization trials in the light.

Could presenting

infants with the doorbell

following their reaches for the toy

backward conditioning of
hypothesis. First of

reliability

all,

(i.e.

to Albert

conditioning

(i.e.

the conditioned stimulus)

the conditioned response) have led to the

infants' reaching behavior? Several facts argue against this

there

is

relatively little evidence in the literature supporting the

of backward conditioning (Shurtleff

According

sound

& Ayres,

1981; Albert

& Ayres,

1997).

& Ayres (1997), "excitatory backward and simultaneous

phenomena

are not robust" (p. 210).

Combined with

the fact that the

overwhelming majority of research investigating backward conditioning comes from
animal

which

literature, the existence

it

may

occur,

is

of this

phenomenon

speculative.
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in

the

humans, and the conditions under

In addition to the uncertainty surrounding

conditions under which

it

backward conditioning and

the

occurs, the design of the current study also
casts doubt on the

suggestion that infants' reaches in the sound-experience group
of the current study

have been the

result of

backward conditioning. According

backward conditioning,

to the standard definition of

the conditioned stimulus follows the unconditioned
stimulus,

which produces some change

in behavior.

In the current study, the doorbell

the conditioned stimulus) followed infants' sight of the object
stimulus),

may

which led them

to

produce a reach for the toy

(i.e.

(i.e.

sound

(i.e.

the unconditioned

the unconditioned

response). In this case, the supposed conditioned stimulus was not presented
until the

response to the unconditioned stimulus

(i.e.

the reach), and therefore, the eventual

conditioned response, was complete. The fact that the doorbell sound followed the

completion of the reach
thus

makes

in the current study,

and therefore the behavior

the suggestion that infants' reaches in the current study

to

be conditioned,

may have been

conditioned highly improbable.

Conclusions
In

two of the

summary,

several results obtained in the current study provide evidence against

greatest challenges facing the reaching in the dark literature, namely, that

infants will reach

to associate

toward sounds

them with graspable

in the

dark even

they have not had the opportunity

objects and that infants' reaches in these studies

have been the result of classical conditioning.
silent-object

when

In general, the fact that infants in the

group of the current study reached infrequently

hypothesis that infants

who have

may

in the

dark supports the

never had the opportunity to associate a novel sound

with a graspable object will not reach

when presented

72

with that sound

in the dark.

More

importantly, the fact that infants in the sound-experience
group reached during more dark
trials

than those in the silent-object group suggests that the
opportunity to form

representations of sounding objects does play a role in infants'
reaching in the dark

toward unseen, sounding objects,

as previous researchers

Clifton, 1988; Clifton, Rochat, et

al.,

have maintained

& Clifton,

1991; McCall

(e.g. Perris

1998; Clifton, 1998,

&

etc.).

Finally, the fact that the design of the current study eliminated the
potential for the

forward conditioning of

infants' reaches also supports to the conclusion that

when

infants

reach for sounding objects in the dark, they do so based on their representations
of those
objects and not simply because they have been conditioned to reach in response to the

sounds of those objects. In
to the

short, the results of the current study lend additional support

primary conclusion drawn from the reaching

infants as

young

as 6 V2

months

in the

form and

are able to

dark

literature,

namely, that

utilize representations of unseen,

sounding objects.
Future Directions

While

infants in the sound-experience group did reach

infants in the silent-object group, the fact that this

between these two groups cannot be ignored.
not produce

more

mind

that while not significant, the differences

previously, one of the major reasons

significance

was

why

more

successful than those of the

between the

it is

important to keep in

silent-object

in the predicted directions.

these differences

the use of the table in presenting the toy.
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than

the only significant difference

At the same time however,

experience groups on these measures were

trials

Infants' in the sound-experience group did

reaches, nor were their reaches

infants in the silent-object group.

was

on more dark

may
It

and sound-

As pointed

out

not have reached

seems

likely that running

this

study with toys presented

in

mid-air

may produce

the significant differences

for here, thereby providing strong
evidence supporting

and

utilize representations.

At the very

young

infants' abilities to

least, therefore, the current

promising design with which the role of representations

toward unseen, sounding objects can be investigated
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in infants'

in the future.

aimed
form

study provides a

reaching in the dark
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